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 In July 1936, units of the Spanish military, backed by a collection of domestic 
right-wing elements and by fascist governments elsewhere in Europe, staged a rebellion 
against the legally constituted national government that had been elected five months 
previously. The governing bloc, an ideologically broad coalition of liberal republicans, 
Marxists, and anarchists known as the People’s Front, embodied the strategy formulated 
by Stalin and the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow to stem the advance 
of international fascism and mitigate the danger it posed to the Soviet Union and, by 
extension, the communist movement and the global radical working class it represented. 
During the destructive and bloody civil war that ensued, the Comintern sponsored 
recruitment of anti-fascist volunteer fighters from around the world. Before the war 
ended, nearly 3,000 Americans had surreptitiously traveled to Spain to defend its 
republican government. This thesis addresses the question of how these volunteers came 
to develop an allegiance to their global political and social movement strong enough to 
motivate them to risk death in what they perceived to be its defense against fascism. 
 Drawing on the theoretical formulations of political scientists Benedict Anderson 
and David Malet, this thesis will demonstrate that over the course of a century, radical 
proletarian internationalism developed into a community of working-class 
revolutionaries, mostly within or allied to communist parties, whose shared ideological 
formulations and sociopolitical aspirations bound them together, irrespective of 
nationality. American members of that global community – whose numbers and influence 
had recently expanded in the context of the Great Depression and the People’s Front 
strategy of liberal-left conciliation – had their perceptions and priorities about the Spanish 
crisis shaped by the American communist press. Examination and analysis of its coverage 
of the political, social, and military dimensions of the conflict there will demonstrate it to 
have been copious and persistent, imparting unmistakably to its readership the centrality 
of the Spanish people’s struggle against fascism in the defense of the global working 
class, whose political and social survival was at stake. The thesis will argue, in the 
context of the contentious historiography of American communism, that although the 
messages conveyed to American proletarian internationalists via the communist press 
reflected policies and priorities determined in Moscow and designed to serve the interests 
of the Soviet state, American anti-fascists were for the most part well informed 
ideologues whose decisions reflected both the concerted influences of their movement’s 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 In an interview with historian Peter Carroll, Esther Silverstein recalled events of 
the 1930s that led to her radicalization and eventual decision to join the communist 
movement. Having trained as a nurse at the University of California, Silverstein worked 
at the Marine Hospital in San Francisco, where she cared for seamen injured in the 
maritime workers’ strikes in that city. Following the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, 
she was assigned a female patient who was comatose upon admission to the hospital. 
Despite appearing moribund, the woman awoke abruptly and asked the nurse, “Has 
Madrid fallen?” lapsing back into unconsciousness upon Silverstein’s assurance that the 
city remained at that point in Republican hands. Subsequently volunteering her nursing 
services to the defenders of the embattled Spanish Republic, the twenty-five-year-old 
Silverstein traveled across the continent to New York, where she boarded the Normandie 
for the trip to Europe. At a rally in Paris, before entering the war zone on the other side of 
the Pyrenees, she donated to the cause of Spanish democracy the fifty dollars her parents 
had given her to buy a return ticket, should she change her mind.
1
     
 What does that anecdote reveal about the mental world of members of the 
working-class movement in the United States during the latter half of the 1930s? This 
thesis will examine the origin, consolidation, and mobilization via the printed word of 
proletarian internationalism, manifest in the decisions of nearly 3,000 young Americans, 
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 Peter N. Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 47. 
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a majority of whom were affiliated with the Communist Party, to risk – and, in many 
instances, lose – their lives fighting fascism in Spain during its 1936-39 civil war. It will 
trace the evolution of the international workers’ movement from its beginnings in mid-
nineteenth century Europe, to its transformation in the aftermath of the Russian 
Revolution and the establishment of the world’s first socialist state, to the development of 
the institution through which the global proletariat aimed to achieve its ultimate goal of 
world revolution: the Communist International (Comintern). The American section of the 
Comintern, the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA), was the political home of many 
working-class radicals in the 1930s and was, at the direction of the Comintern, the 
organization to which responsibility for recruitment of young American ideologues for 
service in Spain fell. In addition to outlining the development of the workers’ movement 
in the United States, this thesis will place its analysis of American participation in the 
Spanish Civil War in the context of the contentious historiography of American 
communism. 
 Although people have participated and died in armed conflict throughout history, 
the nature of their attachments to those in whose defense they served changed when 
subjects of dynastic realms became citizens of nation-states. The cause for which 
combatants in the modern era have most often been willing to die is the putative security 
and success of their own countries. Recognizing that this normative emotional attachment 
to one’s nation-state had previously been under-theorized, political scientist Benedict 
Anderson sought over three decades ago to redress that deficiency. In his influential work 
on the subject, Anderson conceives of the nation as an “imagined community,” in that its 
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members have never met, nor even know anything about, the vast majority of their co-
nationals. He outlines how, during the early modern and modern eras, developments in 
the Americas and Europe, and subsequently much of the rest of the world, transformed a 
type of horizontal allegiance that had previously operated within small groups of 
individuals united by kinship or other forms of close relationship into something keenly 
felt within far larger groups whose members’ ties to one another are only notional. 
Among the cultural forces Anderson sees as having contributed to the origin and spread 
of nationalism is language, specifically print communication.
2
 
 While Anderson’s work was directed toward understanding the foundations of 
people’s willingness in the modern era to die for their countries, the more recent work of 
political scientist David Malet has been motivated by a desire to grasp the motivations 
and, relatedly, methods of recruitment of those who voluntarily fight for groups other 
than their own nation-states. His study aims to shed light on the decisions of the “tens of 
thousands of … foreigners fighting in modern civil wars,” noting that such combatants 
have been, “if not in direct violation of the laws of their own country and the 
international community, at least acting against commonly accepted norms of military 
service, under which individuals are presumed to owe allegiance to their own country and 
to fight on its behalf and not that of an external group.”3 Malet structures his empiric 
investigation according to two dichotomous variables: 1) whether or not ethnicity is the 
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 Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006). 
3
 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 2. 
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parameter that distinguishes the two parties in conflict, and 2) whether or not the foreign 
combatants belong to the same ethnic group as those with whom they have volunteered 
their services. His typology of foreign fighters thus constitutes a two-by-two matrix 
within which all four permutations of his two variables are represented. The category of 
interest for the present project on the Spanish Civil War is the one for which 1) the 
conflict is not an ethnic one, and 2) the foreign volunteers do not share ethnic 
identifications with those whose cause they are supporting. Malet understandably terms 
such fighters “true believers,” explaining that their motivations are “ideological” and 
intended to “preserve institutions of shared transnational identity.”4 
 Just as Anderson emphasizes the centrality of print communication in forging and 
perpetuating nationalist sentiment in the era of its development, Malet recognizes the 
vital role of what he calls “foreign fighter recruitment messaging.” Specifically, he notes 
that successfully attracting foreign combatants entails “framing distant civil conflicts as 
posing a dire threat to all members of a transnational community of which both the 
foreign recruits and local [fighters] are members.”5 Anderson’s and Malet’s formulations 
juxtaposed to each other suggest that “imagined communities” may be national or 
transnational, and that in either case their members’ identifications with them may be of 
sufficient strength to engender a willingness to fight and die in their defense. Moreover, 
written communication serves the function of binding together national and transnational 
communities and reinforcing their members’ affiliations with one another.  
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 Ibid., 42–43. 
5
 Ibid., 4. 
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 Any assumption that deep political allegiances among people in the modern era 
are limited to those united by nationality is belied by the responses of members of the 
international workers’ movement, and most especially by those affiliated with communist 
parties, to the right-wing assault on the Spanish Republic that commenced in 1936. 
Thousands of people from a variety of nations who previously knew no Spaniards, spoke 
no Spanish, and knew little about Spain, volunteered to risk their lives, not for their 
countries but for their social class and political ideas, conceived in global terms.  
 This thesis will demonstrate that proletarian internationalism developed during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries into a global community of working-
class revolutionaries whose shared ideological formulations and sociopolitical aspirations 
bound them together, irrespective of nationality. It was that community, in the United 
States and elsewhere, that by the mid-1930s was prepared to devote itself to the defeat of 
fascism in Spain. Although never representing a large proportion of the US population, 
American communism was an integral component of the global proletarian movement 
whose direction was set by the Comintern in Moscow. The identification of American 
communists – a majority of whom by the summer of 1936 were native born6 – with this 
world-wide community was maintained, bolstered, and shaped in large part via printed 
materials produced by leaders of the movement and read by its members and their allies. 
Prominent among those publications in the United States during the 1930s were the 
CPUSA newspaper, the Daily Worker (and, beginning in 1936, the Sunday Worker), and 
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the weekly magazine New Masses, which was closely associated with the party. 
Examination of coverage of the Spanish crisis in those periodicals, among other relevant 
documents, will demonstrate their roles in the transmission of political ideology from 
points of origin in Moscow, via the CPUSA leadership, to individual readers. The printed 
word – specifically the dissemination of a common lexicon and overall linguistic 
framework within which relevant conceptualizations were cast and shared – will be 
shown to have been vital to the consolidation and mobilization of the community of 
American proletarian internationalists committed to the defense of the Spanish Republic. 
 The thesis is structured chronologically by chapter, although within chapters 
themes that were intertwined contemporaneously are elucidated individually for the 
purpose of analysis. Chapter 2 traces the development of modern proletarian 
internationalism from its origins in nineteenth-century Europe through the establishment 
of the Comintern following the Russian Revolution, the formation and evolution of the 
Communist Party in the United States, and the international communist response to the 
challenge of fascism embodied in the People’s Front strategy. A grasp of the trajectory of 
the international workers’ movement is vital for an understanding of the development of 
the American left, including the CPUSA, which in turn is prerequisite to apprehension of 
the context within which the proletarian response to the Spanish rebellion was mounted.  
 Following that essential background material, the bulk of the argument of the 
thesis and its empiric support are presented in the subsequent three chapters. Chapter 3 
examines the period from the elections of February 1936, in which the Spanish People’s 
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Front came to power, until the July military uprising that instigated armed conflict. 
Chapter 4 picks up at that point and analyzes the first months of the war, culminating in 
the arrival in November of the International Brigades, rendering a nominally civil war a 
de facto international one on both sides. And the interval extending from that point 
through the early months of 1937, when most Americans who would volunteer their 
services to the loyalist cause were either already fighting in Spain or had reached the 
decision to go there, constitutes the subject of Chapter 5. In each of those three chapters, 
material drawn from the copious coverage of Spain in the communist press will 
demonstrate how readers – for the most part members or allies of the revolutionary 
working class – were prompted and guided to see in international fascism a grave and 
immediate threat to their global political movement and social class, and in People’s 
Front anti-fascism under communist leadership its antidote. Such “messaging,” aimed 
largely at those whose allegiances to the then-century-old radical proletarian 
internationalist community were already strong, resulted in the Spanish Republic 
becoming the central preoccupation of American leftists, in defense of which thousands 
of them were willing to risk their lives.  
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CHAPTER 2: PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM AND AMERICAN 
COMMUNISM 
 
 When Spanish society erupted in civil war in 1936, one group of Americans was 
already poised to take an active interest in the outcome. The modern radical international 
proletarian movement, whose origins traced back a century, was at that point represented 
in the United States by a newly vitalized Communist Party. Its stake, and that of its 
fellow parties around the world, in the bloody ideological struggle enacted on the Iberian 
Peninsula had been, and would continue for most of the war’s duration to be, made 
unmistakably explicit to the party’s adherents and allies, largely through its publications. 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis will examine how the community of working-class 
internationalists in the United States was mobilized in the effort to save the Spanish 
Republic from its right-wing assailants. An understanding of that process, however, 
necessitates a grasp of the global movement of which it was part. And that, in turn, 
requires an appreciation of the convolutions and upheavals the movement underwent in 
its development, from humble beginnings in the nineteenth century to the eventual 
establishment of a sophisticated global network of revolutionary parties whose capacity 
to shape the priorities and activities of radical workers and their allies in the United States 
and elsewhere was by 1936 formidable. 
 The emergence of an industrial working class in the modern sense was a 
component of the industrial revolution whose origins were in Great Britain and northwest 
Europe. Among the earliest formal statements of proletarian international affiliation was 
9 
 
an Address to the Belgian Working Classes produced in 1836 by the Working Men’s 
Association. Asserting the identity of “the interests of working men in all countries of the 
world,” it proceeded to recommend that Belgian workers “form, if possible, a union with 
countries around [them],” since “a federation of the working classes of Belgium, Holland 
and the Provinces of the Rhine would form an admirable democracy.”1 Several such 
organizations soon followed, including the Fraternal Democrats and the Communist 
Association for the Education of Working Men. These relatively small groups were 
mostly centered in London and engaged largely in educational efforts – anticipating the 
importance to the proletarian movement of print communication – and expressions of 
solidarity with workers in other countries.
2
 
 Within just a few decades of the origins of modern nationalism described by 
Benedict Anderson and outlined in Chapter 1, Marx and Engels observed that capitalism, 
as a result of its continuous need to expand markets, was undermining the premises of 
nationalism. The condition of the industrial laborer, “the same in England as in France, in 
America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. … The 
working men have no country,” they asserted.3 In an effort to address the disjuncture 
between the goals pursued by nation-states and the needs of the proletariat, Marx and 
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 Marcel van der Linden, “The Rise and Fall of the First International: An Interpretation,” in 
Internationalism in the Labour Movement, 1830-1940, ed. Frits van Holthoon and Marcel van der Linden, 




 Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International Communism from 
Lenin to Stalin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), xviii; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The 
Communist Manifesto, 3rd ed. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2008), 54. 
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Engels founded the Communist League in 1847, and they outlined their program in the 
The Manifesto of the Communist Party. The failures of the revolutions of 1848-49 and the 
restoration of ruling class power that followed led to the league’s dissolution in 1852, but 




 In 1864, the International Workingmen’s Association (IWMA, eventually dubbed 
the First International) was founded in London. As was true of its predecessor 
organizations, it was ideologically committed to working-class internationalism, manifest 
among other ways in its support of the Union and the abolition of slavery during the 
American Civil War, despite the suffering which British textile workers were 
experiencing as a result of disruptions in the cotton trade.
5
 The IMWA diverged from its 
relatively small forebears with respect both to its structure and its activities. It established 
chapters in several continental European countries as well as the United States and Latin 
America. In addition, the new organization focused less on political education and 
propaganda and more on the economic conditions of the working class and promotion of 
proletarian solidarity. The economic antecedents to the establishment of the First 
International included the expansion of 1850-57 followed by the world-wide crisis of 
1857-58, prompting a return to political activity that had been squelched in the aftermath 
of the defeats of 1848-49. This period witnessed rapid, albeit uneven, technological 
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 John Riddell, ed., Founding the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First 
Congress, March 1919, 1st ed., The Communist International in Lenin’s Time (New York: Anchor 
Foundation, 1987), 2–3. 
5
 Philip S. Foner, British Labor and the American Civil War (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), 82–83. 
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developments in the clothing and building industries, among others, creating anxiety and 
protest among the laboring classes.
6
 
 Labor was at that point better organized in Great Britain than elsewhere in Europe 
or the Western Hemisphere, prompting employers there to seek strike breakers from 
abroad. That development motivated British workers to support labor organizing on an 
international basis, as outlined in the address, To the workmen of France from the 
working men of England, published in 1863 in the British trade-union periodical Beehive: 
“A fraternity of peoples is highly necessary for the cause of labour, for we find that 
whenever we attempt to better our social condition by reducing the hours of toil, or by 
raising the price of labour, our employers threaten us with bringing over Frenchmen, 
Germans, Belgians, and others to do our work at a reduced rate of wages.” The statement 
goes on to exhort French workers “not to allow our employers to play us off one against 
the other, and so drag us down to the lowest possible condition, suitable to their 
avaricious bargaining.”7 The burgeoning internationalization of labor markets – occurring 
alongside those of goods and capital – supplied the logic, at least for a time, for the 
internationalization of proletarian organization. 
 The internal ideological heterogeneity of the First International proved to be a 
weakness and a factor in its attenuated lifespan of just a dozen years. The organization 
was composed of republican nationalists in the mold of Giuseppe Mazzini, followers of 
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 van der Linden, “The Rise and Fall of the First International: An Interpretation,” 328–30. 
7
 Ibid., 330–31. 
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the mutualism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, collectivist anarchists such as Mikhail 
Bakunin, and, of course, Marxian socialists. Formed in the wake of French defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War, the Paris Commune of 1871 was a touchstone for the European left 
that, political scientist Carl Levy argues, was dominated neither by Marxists nor by 
anarchists. Nonetheless, its collapse served as a focus for a schism between those two 
factions, with anarchists coming to distinguish their version of internationalism from 
what they saw as an authoritarian, statist socialism advocated by Marx and his allies.
8
  
 While acknowledging the significance generally ascribed to the rift between Marx 
and Bakunin and their followers, labor historian Marcel van der Linden discerns other, 
more structural determinants of the demise of the IWMA, which was disbanded in 1876. 
Although Britain had a clear head start both on industrialization and labor organization, 
parts of the continent and of North America began to catch up. Thus, while British trade 
unionists had for a time felt the need for international cooperation in order to bolster their 
own bargaining positions, the gains won by at least a portion of the working classes 
elsewhere tempered British workers’ enthusiasm for internationalism. In addition, the 
global economic depression that began in 1870 abetted a shift in the labor movement 
from grand ideological objectives to more immediate economic ones. And lastly, the 
period following the Franco-Prussian War saw the sort of chauvinistic nationalism that 
had previously been the province of the bourgeoisie expand into the working classes, as a 
result of both purposeful public policies and the aspirations of sections of the proletariat. 
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 Carl Levy, “Anarchism, Internationalism and Nationalism in Europe, 1860–1939,” Australian Journal of 
Politics & History 50, no. 3 (September 2004): 333–36. 
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For those reasons, van der Linden views neither the split between anarchists and Marxists 
nor the destruction of the Paris Commune itself as the chief causes of the collapse of the 
IWMA.
9
 Although ephemeral, Lenin later wrote that “the First International laid the 
foundation of the proletarian, international struggle for socialism.”10 And it was a crucial 
antecedent to the mobilization of the global working classes in the cause of Spain decades 
later.    
 The form that struggle assumed next was fashioned in Paris in 1889. Addressing 
the delegates to the congress at which the Socialist International (Second International) 
was inaugurated, Marx’s son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, noted that attendees came not as 
standard-bearers of their separate nations, but rather under “the red flag of the 
international proletariat” whose “single common enemy [was] private capital, whether it 
be Prussian, French, or Chinese.” For the next twenty-five years, representatives of 
socialist parties and trade unions – mostly but not entirely in Europe and the United 
States – gathered every two to three years to advance the cause of working-class 
internationalism. Lacking centralized authority, the congresses debated resolutions but 
could not enforce their implementation. In efforts to bolster the coherence and discipline, 
and thus potency, of the organization, anarchists were barred from membership in 1896, 
and four years later the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) in Brussels was formed as 
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 V. I. Lenin, “The Third International and Its Place in History,” in Founding the Communist 
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The Communist International in Lenin’s Time (New York: Anchor Foundation, 1987), 32. 
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the standing executive body of the International.
11
 The successor to Marx’s First 
International of the mid-nineteenth century appeared poised to enter the twentieth century 
as a consolidated instrument of proletarian internationalism. 
 Arguably the centerpiece of the program of the International was peace, described 
in a unanimously approved resolution from its initial congress as “the first and 
indispensable condition of any worker emancipation.” The resolution characterized war 
as “the most tragic product of present economic relations, [which] can only disappear 
when capitalist production has made way for the emancipation of labor and the 
international triumph of socialism.” In the question of the inevitability of capitalism 
engendering war, the eventual fracture of the international socialist movement into 
reformists and radicals could be discerned, particularly after 1900. The “right” advocated 
gradual reforms within the context of democracy while the “left” called for revolutionary 
mass action; the social democratic parties in several countries divided along reformist (or 
broad) versus revolutionary (or narrow) lines. For its part, the International maintained a 
principled commitment to revolutionary Marxism while practicing ideological flexibility 
in the interest of unity.
12
 
 The challenge of pursuing Marxist internationalism in the face of growing 
nationalist tensions and colonial rivalries increasingly plagued the International after 
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1905. At the Stuttgart congress in 1907, a debate on “Militarism and National Conflict” 
considered four different resolutions on the subject, whose contents ranged from a call for 
a general strike in case of war to claims of the legitimacy of national self-defense. 
Eventually a synthesis was achieved and approved unanimously. It identified the 
capitalist system as the cause of militarism, exhorted socialists to work in their own 
countries to prevent war, and concluded with a statement authored by leftist Rosa 
Luxemburg: “Should war break out in spite of all this, it is their [socialists’] duty to 
intercede for its speedy end, or to strive with all their power to make use of the violent 
economic and political crisis brought about by the war to rouse the people and thereby to 
hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule.” But it was the president of the International, 
Belgian Emile Vandervelde, who had the last word, seeking in his closing statement to 
unite the disparate factions at the congress while affirming national rights to self-defense, 




 At its two subsequent congresses – Copenhagen in 1910 and Basel in 1912 – the 
International reaffirmed its formulation that only the demise of capitalism and 
imperialism would protect the world from war. In 1910 the organization advocated as an 
interim prophylactic measure the elimination of standing armies, and two years later 
characterized “the fear of the ruling classes that a world war might be followed by a 
proletarian revolution” as “an essential guarantee of peace.” But the proposal for an 
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agreement that would bind the constituent members of the International to a general 
strike in the event of war again failed, leaving the body without a unified, and potentially 
potent, strategy. These debates occurred in the context of deepening divisions between 
reformists and revolutionaries within the organization, with members of the former 
faction expressing the conviction that socialism would be achieved within the framework 
of the nation-state system and that colonialism and national self-defense were not 
inconsistent with socialist sensibilities. Although such sentiments were disavowed by 
leftist delegates such as Luxemburg and Lenin, as the European cataclysm approached, 
German Social Democrats August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht could coin as their 
party’s slogan, “For This System, Not One Man and Not One Penny,” alongside 
affirmation of the doctrine “never to abandon a single piece of German soil to the 
foreigner.”14 
 In the crisis that followed in the wake of the assassination of the Austrian 
archduke in Sarajevo, the International sponsored anti-war demonstrations, and in late 
July 1914 the executive committee of the ISB met in Brussels but failed to formulate an 
effective anti-war plan. With the European powers mobilizing for war, a representative of 
the German Social Democratic party met in Paris on August 1 with leaders of the French 
Socialist Party, though the meeting did not yield a coordinated strategy or set of 
commitments. Three days later, as German forces invaded Belgium as a prelude to their 
attack on France, parliamentarians of Europe’s two most prominent socialist parties 
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unanimously cast their votes in favor of their respective governments’ requests for 
military appropriations, barely camouflaging the considerable divisions in each party. 
War had exposed the schism within the international workers’ movement and when it 
counted, national “defensism” had prevailed over socialist internationalism. Mirroring 
developments across the continent, International President Vandervelde entered his 
country’s war cabinet and some socialists’ nationalist bellicosity came to rival that of 
their non-Marxist fellow countrymen. Having been unable for years to reach agreement 
on policies toward bourgeois democracy, nationalism, the potential weapon of the general 
strike, and ultimately war itself, the Second International unraveled in what Lenin labeled 
a “sheer betrayal of socialism” that revealed the “ideological and political bankruptcy of 
the International.”15     
 In early 1915, socialists from the two sides of the war met separately – those from 
the Allied Countries in London and representatives from the Central Powers in Vienna – 
while socialists from neutral countries were ineffective at advocating collectively for 
peace, and the ISB remained inactive. Efforts at reanimating international socialist 
opposition to the war led to the organization of a conference at Zimmerwald, Switzerland 
in September 1915, bringing together opponents of the war from both sides. Although a 
majority of those present at Zimmerwald aimed to restore the International as a peace 
movement, a left-wing faction led by Lenin advocated for recognition that the prewar 
organization had shown itself disastrously ill-equipped – organizationally and 
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ideologically – for the task, and that a new one was needed. On the day after the 
conference adjourned, the bloc of delegates assembled by Lenin created an informal 
group, dubbed the Zimmerwald Left, dedicated to revolutionary socialist 
internationalism. They recognized that the Second International had become simply a 
forum for consultation among socialist parties organized on national lines. The parties 
had, at least tacitly, accommodated themselves to the international system and to working 
within it for reforms on behalf of the proletariat. With the international system embroiled 
in the war that socialists had found themselves unable to prevent, the Zimmerwald Left 
sought establishment of a Third, uncompromisingly revolutionary, International to 
represent the interests of the laboring classes of all nations.
16
 
 The October 1917 seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia was seen by its 
protagonists as the first step in the inevitable collapse of the capitalist world system and 
its replacement by international revolutionary Marxism. They, in fact, counted on it, 
grasping the improbability of survival of a lone communist regime in an otherwise-
capitalist world. And for a relatively brief period of time their hopes and assumptions 
appeared to be on the verge of realization. The end of the war was attended by the 
collapse of the old polities of central and eastern Europe amid strikes, revolts, and the 
formation of communist parties from the left wings of social democratic movements. 
Most reassuring of all was the November 1918 revolution in Germany. But after the 
Spartacist uprising in Berlin was violently suppressed in January 1919, and the Bolshevik 
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success in Russia failed to take hold anywhere else, revolutionary socialists apprehended 
the need for an international party to lead the world revolution. Lenin’s call dating back 
to 1915 for a Third International to assume leadership of a radicalized world-wide 
Marxist revolutionary movement would take the form, in 1919, of the Communist 
International. Among the many questions it would face during the course of its existence 
would be how to maintain the primacy of proletarian internationalism over the parochial 
nationalisms on which its predecessor organization had so catastrophically foundered.
17
 
As will be evident below, that challenge not only remained unsolved; it became an 
especially contentious focus of discord within the workers’ movement in the context of 
international involvement in the civil war in Spain.  
 The First Congress of the Communist International opened in Moscow on March 
2, 1919. It was attended by fifty-one delegates representing thirty-five political 
organizations in twenty-two countries, including the United States.
18
 Despite the 
Comintern’s explicit foundation as an international body, its location in Moscow 
reflected the crucial fact that Russia was to date the only instance of successful 
communist revolution. In that context the prestige that attached to the Russian Bolsheviks 
was inevitable and, combined with the relative weakness of other communist parties and 
the enormous practical difficulties posed by travel from foreign countries to and from 
Moscow, it ensured that Russians would dominate the operation of the Comintern. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether the Bolshevik model of a vanguard party of 
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revolutionary purists would necessarily apply to the Comintern and its affiliates required 
the attention of the 1920 Second Comintern Congress, at which the more than two 
hundred delegates in attendance approved the “Twenty-one Conditions” of admission to 
the organization drafted by Comintern President Grigory Zinoviev. Inspired by Lenin, the 
conditions were designed to ensure a disciplined and highly centralized Third 
International. The Third and Fourth Congresses in 1921 and 1922 further reinforced the 
application of the Bolshevik organizational and ideological model to the Comintern, 
laying the foundation of its “Russification,” as protection of the Soviet state in what was 
turning out to be a non-revolutionary world became a communist preoccupation that 
would later guide Comintern policies on Spain.
19
 
 The failure of German revolution in 1923 and the period of “relative capitalist 
stabilization” that followed revealed that earlier optimism about the impending European 
revolution had been misplaced. Those developments of the early and mid-1920s also 
served to emphasize the isolation and thus potential fragility of the Soviet state. Lenin’s 
death in January 1924 prompted bitter intraparty struggles over the direction of the 
Revolution, with Stalin emerging as Lenin’s successor. The subsequent four years saw 
shifts between “right” and “left” tendencies within both the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and the Comintern, but Bolshevization of the Third International and its 
constituent parties around the world proceeded apace, leaving the leadership of the 
Russian party in firm control of the international communist movement. Among the 
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doctrinal turns initiated by Stalin in this period was that of “socialism in one country.” 
Although he defended it against charges of deviation from Leninist orthodoxy, the notion 
that the Soviet Union could survive without successfully fomenting revolution elsewhere 
was of tremendous significance. Noting that the conditions for European revolutions had 
become unfavorable, Stalin argued that the survival of the Soviet Union was paramount 
to the ultimate triumph of the international proletariat. Thus, the interests of the Soviet 
state became – by this logic – congruent with those of the Comintern and of communists 
everywhere: the “national” interests of the USSR, in other words, were identical with 
those of the international working class.
20
 This principle – which became axiomatic for 
orthodox communists – was one of the most consequential of the Stalin era. 
 The Sixth Comintern Congress met over the course of the latter six weeks of the 
summer of 1928. Its theorists had perceived evidence that conditions for the ultimate 
crisis of capitalism, wars among the imperialist nations, revolutionary ferment, and the 
spread of socialism were turning its favor.
21
 The “left turn” embodied in the highly 
sectarian policies that characterized international communism’s “Third Period,” which 
the Sixth Congress inaugurated, was disastrous for many of the world’s communist 
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 Inside the Soviet Union, Stalin pursued acceleration of the process of building 
socialism, with programs of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization of 
agriculture alongside campaigns of class warfare directed against “bourgeois specialists,” 
peasants, and members of the intelligentsia. Those militant and disruptive internal 
policies were mirrored in the Comintern’s project of enforcing ideological homogeneity, 
resulting in persecutions and expulsions which took a major toll on communist parties in 
Europe and America.
23
 Particular scorn was directed toward social democrats, labeled 
“social fascists” and considered more dangerous than actual fascists by virtue of their 
pseudo-revolutionary camouflage. Although historian E. H. Carr argued against the 
assumption that Stalin’s tight control was behind the change of Comintern policy, 
characterizing him as “heavily engaged elsewhere” and “not tempted to concern himself 
with … an institution he had always despised,” evidence from the Comintern Archives to 
which Carr did not have access leads to a different conclusion.
24
 
 As a national leader Stalin’s primary concern was the security of the Soviet 
Union, and by the end of the 1920s (if not earlier) it appeared to be the Comintern’s as 
well. Among its roles was garnering support among the international proletariat for the 
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defense of the standard bearer of socialism. Soviet relations with other governments, 
however, were the remit of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or 
Narkomindel. Early on, ties between it and the Comintern were close, but during the 
period of “relative capitalist stabilization” the diplomatic mission of Narkomindel 
diverged from what had been the revolutionary mandate of the Comintern. Stalin’s 
“socialism in one country” doctrine had been reassuring to western governments but the 
strident rhetoric of the Third Period threatened to complicate diplomatic efforts with the 
West and thereby potentially endanger Soviet security. By 1930 Comintern leaders 
combined admonitions against “rightist deviation” (associated with the “social fascist” 
formulation) with warnings of danger from the left in the form of excessive revolutionary 
fervor on the parts of foreign communist parties, especially the German one. The 
Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in early 1930 that made 
explicit the expectation that “the defense of the Soviet Union against the threat of 
imperialist attack is more than ever before the important task of all sections of the 
Communist International.” Although some room for local initiative among communist 
parties may have remained, by the early 1930s the Comintern had to a great extent 
become a centralized and bureaucratized instrument of the foreign policy of one 
country.
25
 Later Soviet interest in and Comintern policy on Spain were thus synonymous.  
 In the context of Third Period doctrine, the Nazi assumption of power in Germany 
in 1933 was initially viewed by the Comintern as more of an opportunity than a threat. 
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The final crisis of world capitalism appeared to be on the horizon and communist parties 
needed to be vigilant and prepared to seize the impending opening for revolution. Their 
attitude was evident in the optimistic slogan, “After Hitler, us.” Over the following 
couple of years, however, a very different reality became apparent. The consolidation of 
Nazi control was accompanied by the destruction of the large and previously powerful 
German working-class movements, including the Communist and Social Democratic 
Parties. In the wake of Third Period policies, not only had the largest communist party 
outside the Soviet Union been demolished; fifty-six of the seventy-two parties of the 
Comintern were illegal in their home countries, an Austrian proletarian revolt against the 
right-wing regime in Vienna was suppressed, and a potential fascist takeover in France 
appeared plausible.
26
 It began to occur to some communists that a change of strategy 
might be in order. 
 With the Nazis in power in Germany, Europe’s largest Comintern sections were 
the Communist Parties of France and Czechoslovakia. Their leaders, Maurice Thorez and 
Klement Gottwald respectively, urged the Comintern to seek anti-fascist cooperation with 
social democratic parties (“social fascists” in Third Period parlance), but were initially 
rebuffed. Following right-wing demonstrations against the government of French Premier 
Édouard Daladier in Paris on February 6, 1934, communist and socialist workers staged a 
successful general strike. Although further anti-fascist collaboration was at that point 
opposed by both the French Communist Party and the Comintern, the new General 
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Secretary of the latter, Georgi Dimitrov, soon became convinced of the advisability of a 
united front, and in July 1934 the French Communist and Socialist Parties signed an anti-
fascist “Pact of Unity of Action.” Stalin seems only to have endorsed the new People’s 
Front policy overtly in December, after Thorez had succeeded in expanding it to include 
members of the French bourgeois center-left party.
27
  
 The foregoing account appears to furnish evidence that, despite the 
Bolshevization of the Comintern and its constituent parties, and the Russification of their 
objectives, rank-and-file workers and individual communist parties were still able to take 
some initiative and exert some influence over policy. The motivation behind the 
Comintern’s change of course from Third Period ideological stridency and confrontation 
to People’s Front anti-fascist eclecticism and cooperation has been subject to intense 
historiographical debate. Dissident-communist historian Fernando Claudín avers that the 
original signal for the policy shift actually came from Stalin and that its “explanation lies 
– as with other turns made by the Comintern – in Soviet policy, and, more specifically, in 
Soviet foreign policy.”28 More recent Comintern historians Kevin McDermott and 
Jeremy Agnew, however, advance a more complex formulation in which initiative from 
various communist parties and debates within the Comintern leadership interacted with 
the Soviet state’s goal of security in the face of fascist expansionism to give birth to the 
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policy innovation. Whatever its origins, it was enshrined as doctrine at the Seventh 
Comintern Congress in the summer of 1935, where Dimitrov sought to reconcile the 
apparent contradictions between communist internationalism and bourgeois nationalism 
that the new coalitions entailed: 
 [P]roletarian internationalism must, so to speak, “acclimatize itself” in each 
 country in order to sink deep roots in its native land. National forms of the 
 proletarian class struggle … in the individual countries are in no contradiction 
 to proletarian internationalism; on the contrary, it is precisely in these forms 





 None of this should be mistaken for a reversal of Bolshevization in the 
Comintern. In fact, the mid- to late 1930s saw an intensification of centralized control 
and a strengthening of Stalin’s influence, as became evident in the context of the Spanish 
Civil War. Although the Spanish Communist Party had been among Europe’s smallest, it 
nevertheless played a part in the formation and electoral success of the People’s Front 
coalition there. The right-wing coup that followed the 1936 election created a dilemma 
for Stalin and the Comintern: a Soviet presence on the Iberian Peninsula might frighten 
French (and other western) public opinion and drive them to the right, while a victory for 
the forces under Franco would create another foothold for fascism in Europe that could 
attract further support, thereby threatening Soviet security. Although Stalin decided by 
late September to arm the Loyalist forces, the potential perils for Soviet foreign policy of 
both failure and success of the left in Spain were never far from his mind. Dimitrov 
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emphasized to the Comintern Executive Committee that the objective in Spain was the 
defeat of fascism and not the creation of a Soviet-style state. The communists were in that 
crucial sense aligned with moderate socialists and bourgeois liberals, and in often-bitter 
conflict with revolutionary socialists, Trotskyists, and anarchists whose aims were more 
radical. Thus, the heavy hand of the Stalinist Comintern was directed in Spain against 
both fascists and leftist revolutionaries, as will be seen in greater detail below.
30
  
 Perhaps the greatest contradiction to the apparent ideological flexibility 
represented by the People’s Front policy of the Soviet government and Comintern was 
the Great Terror, unleashed by Stalin between 1936 and 1938. Although its purely 
internal manifestations and effects are beyond the scope of this thesis, its consequences 
for the international communist movement are not. Swept up in the xenophobic 
atmosphere of the purges were members of communist parties from Germany, 
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland. The 
Polish party sustained the greatest devastation: in the spring and summer of 1937, an 
estimated five thousand Polish communists were arrested and shot. Many purge victims 
were officials in the Comintern apparatus, which Stalin had become convinced was a nest 
of anti-Soviet subversives and spies. Speculation regarding motives for the Terror has 
ranged widely over the years. Stalin’s own well documented paranoid outlook is surely 
relevant, but does not address the timing of the purge or its specific targets. Some 
historians have viewed the attack on early followers of Lenin as evidence of what 
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amounted to a counter-revolution. Archival research supports the formulation, credited to 
historian Jonathan Haslam, that among the intended objects of Stalin’s violence were 
those who maintained a commitment to revolutionary internationalism over the interests 
of the Soviet state.
31
 That ideological stance was most associated with Leon Trotsky, 
founder of the Red Army who was expelled from the party, and eventually from the 
USSR, in the late 1920s. As will be evident below, the promiscuous application of the 
epithet “Trotskyism” came to denote all deviations from Stalin’s brand of Russocentric 
communism, with often-grim consequences for those so labeled.  
 Having outlined the origins and development of the international workers’ 
movement, attention will now turn specifically to its evolution within the United States, 
where, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, it had taken root in the context of rapid 
industrialization. The Socialist Labor Party, established in the 1870s as the first socialist 
party in the United States, was soon eclipsed in membership and influence by the 
Socialist Party of America, founded in 1901. The Socialist Party (SP) was, during the 
early twentieth century, an uneasy amalgam of varying backgrounds and points of view. 
In the aftermath of the failure of the Second International to prevent the First World War, 
and buoyed by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the left wing of the SP broke away in 
1919. Reflecting one of the schisms present in the parent party, a faction dominated by 
the SP’s foreign-language federations formed the Communist Party of America, while a 
group that included more American-born members organized the rival Communist Labor 
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Party. In what historian Theodore Draper argues set an early precedent, members of the 
American communist movement sought adjudication of their internal disputes by the 
newly inaugurated Comintern in Moscow, which instructed the American party to unite. 
Moreover, according to Draper’s formulation, the prestige enjoyed by the Russian party 
as the world’s only communist party to have achieved political power in its home country 
ensured its dominance of the Comintern, and thus of what became the Communist Party 
of the USA as well.
32
 
 As the likelihood of world-wide revolution receded during the early 1920s, Lenin 
urged, and the Comintern instituted, a “united front” policy whereby communists were 
directed to pursue their political work through mass organizations such as labor unions 
and broader based farmer-labor parties. Although American communists achieved some 
limited success, sudden changes in Comintern policy kept party membership low and 
internecine factional struggles prominent. “Bolshevization” of the Comintern in the mid-
1920s – entailing increasingly direct control by the Comintern over non-Russian parties – 
reinforced both the image of the Communist Party as out of touch with mainstream 
American life and the reality of its marginal role in American politics. As described 
above, Stalin’s eventual assumption of power in Moscow following Lenin’s death 
brought with it a series of dizzying doctrinal shifts with which members of the American 
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communist leadership were preoccupied and on which several of their careers foundered. 
That James P. Cannon was expelled for his 1928 conversion to Trotskyism while Jay 
Lovestone was stripped of party membership for his “right deviation” serves to 
underscore the extent to which fealty to Stalin and readiness to support his policies as 
relayed via the Soviet party and Comintern to its affiliates around the globe had become 
the touchstone of good standing in the international communist movement.
33
 
 The dire hardships of the Great Depression that developed in the wake of the 
stock market crash of 1929 would only eventually improve the position of the CPUSA as 
a serious political force. The party sought to organize the unemployed and, for example, 
participated in leadership of the 1932 Hunger March in Detroit, but they derived little 
lasting benefit from such activities. The early 1930s saw the leftward ideological drift of 
many intellectuals, though not yet to the ranks of the CPUSA, whose Third Period 
dogmatism since the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 – especially its hostility toward 
the non-communist left – seriously impeded its aspirations of becoming a mass party. The 
successes of the labor movement and the increase in strike activity in 1934 occurred for 
the most part independent of CP involvement, whose efforts at infiltrating and taking 
over leadership of mass organizations – “boring from within” – was not proving effective 
at engendering working-class or agrarian commitment to the party. Prior to the 
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Comintern’s shift in policy toward the People’s Front strategy, CPUSA membership 
remained heavily foreign-born, urban, unemployed, and small.
34
 
 The turning point that marked the rise of the CPUSA from marginality to relative 
prominence in American politics was the movement of the Comintern to a far more 
conciliatory – and eventually overtly collaborative – stance toward the non-communist 
left. As noted above, the termination of Third Period stridency was motivated by the 
growing threat (not least to the security of the USSR) of fascism/Nazism and the 
concomitant reversals suffered by the international proletarian movement. In that context, 
the CPUSA was given wide latitude by the Comintern to broaden its appeal and thereby 
its potential impact. Although the communist parties in France and Spain became open 
members of People’s Front coalitions, in the United States the party unambiguously 
affiliated with the Democrats – specifically Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal – 
gaining particular influence in the Democratic parties of Washington and California as 
well as in the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota and the Labor Party of New York. 
CPUSA support of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), born in 1935 to 
organize industrial workers excluded from the American Federation of Labor (AFL), 
provided a major venue for communist leadership. The party also came to play prominent 
roles in the areas of unemployment and social insurance legislation, youth and student 
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organizations such as the American Youth Congress and the American Student Union, as 
well as the National Negro Congress and the League of American Writers.
35
 
 The acknowledgment that fascism rather than bourgeois liberalism represented an 
imminent danger to the working class, and to the embodiment in the Soviet polity of its 
political aspirations, was the crucial doctrinal reversal that made possible the role played 
by the CPUSA in the response of American leftists to the civil war in Spain. By 1936 
many American progressives – workers in the CIO and other labor organizations, the 
unemployed, college students and other young people, intellectuals, African Americans, 
Jews, New Deal liberals, as well as socialists and communists – had begun to define their 
political identities as “anti-fascists.” This triumph of the People’s Front strategy of the 
Comintern and the CPUSA was expressed in a rehabilitation of the image of the party 
from a fringe organization of foreign-oriented revolutionaries to a legitimate, energetic 
participant in American progressive politics. That transition, in turn, abetted growth in 
the party’s size and influence, and thus its ability to facilitate sympathy and tangible aid – 
up to and including enlistment for combat – from Americans to the Spanish Republic.36 
Stalin’s frequently repeated assertion that “the cause of Spain is the common cause of the 
whole of progressive and advanced mankind” became self-fulfilling. 
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 As outlined above, modern proletarian internationalism developed over the course 
of several decades into a substantial and variegated movement. By the mid-1930s its best 
organized and most active segment in the United States was the CPUSA. Always 
controversial due to its revolutionary ideology and foreign ties, assessments of its 
participation in society and politics – including its role during the war in Spain – became 
especially fraught with the onset of the Cold War. The formal historiography of 
American communism dates to that era and has since the late twentieth century been 
considered to divide along “traditionalist” versus “revisionist” lines.37 Those scholars in 
the traditionalist camp – exemplified by Draper and Klehr, cited above – have tended to 
focus on the institutional history of the CPUSA and its subservience to the Soviet party 
and Comintern. They are thus inclined to view all policies of and activities directed by 
the party as having been motivated ultimately by the needs of the Soviet state and carried 
out at its behest. The first scholarly challenge to that conceptualization of American 
communist history came in the context of the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s. 
“Revisionist” historians of that era, trained in social history and motivated to locate the 
heritage of contemporary radicalism in a rehabilitated left-wing past, pursued studies of 
communist-led reform movements in various localities and among various racial and 
ethnic groups in the United States, particularly during the 1930s. The responses of 
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American communists and their affiliated groups to local labor and racial conditions were 




 The present study does not seek to litigate that decades-old dispute, both sides of 
which have empirically demonstrable merit. Rather, it seeks to elucidate the means by 
which thousands of American ideologues – a majority of whom were affiliated with the 
CPUSA – who came to imagine themselves members of a global community of anti-
fascist proletarian internationalists were mobilized by the party and its copious 
publications to risk their lives in its defense.  
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CHAPTER 3: TRIUMPH OF THE PEOPLE’S FRONT AND THE COMMUNITY 
OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISTS 
 
 By the mid-1930s there was no shortage of crises competing for the attention of 
the global proletarian community. In 1931 a reactionary, expansionist Japanese regime 
seized from China the resource-rich province of Manchuria, establishing there its satellite 
state of Manchukuo the following year. In the heart of Europe a political party and 
movement that had operated on the far-right fringe of political life was elevated to power 
in 1933, and its Führer quickly set about crushing Germany’s formidably organized 
working class, among other enemies. Mussolini’s unabashed, if anachronistic, colonial 
aspirations found expression in the brutal Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. All of 
these threats, among others, were the subjects of considerable coverage and commentary 
in the American communist press. But what became the defining ideological battleground 
of the era, and arguably of the century, had an unlikely address on the southwest 
periphery of Europe.  
 After a brief review of the historical context in which the deep and longstanding 
fissures of Spanish society and politics eventuated in open warfare, this chapter will 
begin the examination of the central role played by publications of, or associated with, 
the CPUSA in nurturing the commitment of the American left to the cause of the Spanish 
Republic. It will focus on the period from the elections of February 1936, which brought 
the People’s Front to power, to the military rebellion of July of that year, which sparked 
civil war. It is during that interval that one may discern the themes around which 
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members of the radical working-class movement and their allies had their understandings 
of the significance of that far-away conflict structured for them by the communist press. 
Much of the evidence adduced in this and subsequent chapters is drawn from the official 
organ of the CPUSA. First appearing on January 13, 1924, the Daily Worker was by 1936 
a full-scale newspaper covering local, national, and international events.
1
 It was also the 
nation’s most visible exponent of proletarian internationalism. Its editorial writers and 
cartoonists in New York, its reporters in Spain, and the many party ideologues and guest 
columnists whose work appeared in its pages warned of the grave fascist threat to the 
world’s working classes. They emphasized the centrality of the People’s Front anti-fascist 
coalition strategy, including its communist leadership, Soviet inspiration, and ultimate 
revolutionary goals. They presented the Spanish workers’ and peasants’ republic as an 
exemplar of the humane and progressive world for which their movement strove but 
whose precariousness necessitated vigilance and dedication. 
 Among the world’s languages, Spanish ranks second only to Chinese as boasting 
the largest number of native speakers. That fact is a residue of the outsized importance of 
Spain in the history of the early modern world. But its trajectory among the world’s 
nations following its remarkable global territorial conquests in the sixteenth century has 
been largely one of declining prominence. Spain’s deteriorating international status, 
culminating in the 1898 loss of what had remained of its empire as a consequence of a 
disastrous war with the United States, led some scholars to view the Iberian nation as 
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suffering from a chronic illness.
2
 Although consideration of Spain as an exceptional case 
among the nation-states of western Europe has doubtless been overdrawn, the slow pace 
and unevenness of its modernization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
distinguished it from much of the rest of the West and laid the foundation for the horrific 
carnage of its eventual civil war.
3
 
 Throughout the nineteenth (and well into the twentieth) century, Spanish politics 
remained disproportionately in the hands of the owners of large estates – the latifundios. 
Although the northern part of the country experienced gradual industrialization, 
capitalism in Spain was until recently primarily agrarian. The commercial and 
manufacturing classes were too small and politically insignificant to engender a 
bourgeois liberal revolution of the sort seen elsewhere during the nineteenth century. Dire 
economic conditions combined with political chaos resulted in the abdication of the 
monarch and the establishment of the short-lived First Republic in 1873, but it was 
crushed by the army the following year and the monarchy, along with the power of the 
old elites, was subsequently restored. The decades preceding World War I saw the rise of 
working-class and regionalist movements whose roles in the later civil war would be 
central. The Socialist Party of Spain (PSOE, its Spanish initials) was founded in 1879, 
followed shortly by its affiliated trade union organization, the UGT. While those 
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institutions attracted members of the increasingly militant industrial working class, 
landless day-laborers in the rural south gravitated toward anarchism, though by 1910 that 
ideology had taken sufficient hold among the urban proletariat as well to populate the 
anarcho-syndicalist trade union, the CNT. And shortly following the end of the war, 
consistent with the history of the revolutionary workers’ movement outlined in Chapter 2, 
the PSOE divided over the question of joining the Comintern, with the more radical 
faction forming the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) in 1921.
4
 
 In the context of growing proletarian militancy, including strikes in the mining 
and iron and steel industries, and consequent anxiety among the ruling classes, a coup 
d’état was staged by General Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923. The period of his 
dictatorship would come to be revered in retrospect by the right wing, but its failures led 
eventually to the king’s abdication and the advent in 1931 of the Second Republic. The 
reformist government that was elected to write a constitution included Socialists, 
Republicans, and Radicals (members of a centrist party popular among the rural 
bourgeoisie). Anti-clerical elements of the new, democratic constitution proved 
especially divisive, coming in the wake of a spate of church burnings that expressed the 
revulsion of the working classes toward the reactionary role of the Church in Spanish 
society. The previously disparate right – consisting of two groups of monarchists, several 
collections of overt fascists, and Catholic-oriented organizations – was coalesced under 
the banner of the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA; Spanish 
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Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing Groups) by José María Gil Robles. 
Meanwhile, the left was weakened by the refusal of anarchists to ally with the governing 
coalition and by the decision of the Socialists to run on their own, independent of the 
bourgeois Republicans. Consistently attacking the Republic as an instrument of 
Bolsheviks, Freemasons, and Jews whose goals included the destruction of Christian 
Europe, the right – now in alliance with the Radicals – won power in 1933, ushering in 
the “bienio negro” (black two years).5  
 Although candidates of the left probably received more votes than their opponents 
on the right, the disunity of the former combined with likely electoral irregularities 
perpetrated by the latter had handed power to the CEDA and its partners, which they 
were determined to use to dismantle the reforms of the previous two years. The 
reactionary aims of the right fed radicalization of the working classes, expressed most 
consequentially in the events of October 1934 in the northwest mining province of 
Asturias. The socialist and anarchist trade union organizations, together with the 
Communists, staged a strike that was brutally suppressed, in a foreshadowing of the 
coming civil war, by legionnaires under the command of Francisco Franco. Events of that 
fall would reverberate for years but had the more immediate effects of bolstering the 
right’s determination to crush republican democracy while persuading the left that 
regaining power depended on its ability to reunite. The leader of the left wing of the 
Socialist Party, Francisco Largo Caballero, was convinced to temper his revolutionary 
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impulses and ally with the Republicans, while the Communists were prompted in that 
same direction by the change of Comintern policy discussed in Chapter 2. The elections 
of February 16, 1936 returned the reins of government to a reunified left. The fissures 
that had long divided Spanish society, however, remained deep and dangerous.
6
 
 Although the American communist press did not become thoroughly preoccupied 
with events in Spain until the military pronunciamento of July 1936, the importance it 
attached to the success of the People’s Front strategy – made official by the Seventh 
World Congress of the Comintern in August 1935 – was nevertheless evident. Moreover, 
most of the themes that would come to characterize its coverage of the later civil war and 
the international politics surrounding it are discernable in the news articles, features, 
editorials, and photographs published during the five months between the elections that 
brought the People’s Front to power and the right-wing coup that eventually brought it 
down. Collectively, these pieces served to instill and consolidate among a working-class 
readership and its allies several interrelated convictions that would tie them ever more 
tightly into the global community of proletarian anti-fascists. 
 On Spain’s election day, readers of the Sunday Worker were apprised of the local 
stakes of that contest: “In the victory of the right there lies the danger of fascism. 
Included in the program of the People’s Front is amnesty for 30,000 political prisoners 
…, reinstatement of all workers dismissed for political reasons; restoration of all trade 
union rights and property confiscated after the revolution [of 1931]; dismissal of all 
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Monarchist and fascist state officials and army and navy officers.”7 In the aftermath of 
the People’s Front triumph, euphoria over its electoral success mixed with a variety of 
other, complementary messages in the American communist press, including the 
continuing – indeed, building – dangers of world fascism, the leadership and ultimate 
revolutionary aims of communists in a broader-based, democratic movement, and the 
need for anti-fascist vigilance and activism at home.  
 “Do you wish to see the People’s Front in action against Fascism? Look at 
Spain!” the Daily Worker exulted two days after the elections. “World Fascism has good 
reason to tremble. All foes of reaction, of war, for the liberation of the toilers, have 
excellent cause to rejoice. We must drink deeply of the inspiration of our brother fighters 
in Spain,” it continued, proceeding to predict a leftist surge throughout Europe and urging 
on its American readership in its own “fight against war, against fascism, and for the 
workers’ every day needs against rapacious capitalism.”8 In a gesture of left-wing 
solidarity, Israel Amter, New York CP district organizer, wrote to his counterpart in the 
Socialist Party, Jack Altman, to suggest that they organize a joint celebration, noting that 
“the united front victory of the Spanish people against fascist reaction is a source of 
inspiration and strength to workers and anti-fascists throughout the world.” Recognizing 
that “the victory of our brothers in Spain is not yet assured,” Amter expressed the hope 
that proletarian unity “would pave the way for active help to the Spanish people by the 
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labor movement and all other progressive and anti-fascist organizations.”9 In this 
aspiration lay the nub of the strategy of the left and, in particular, of its communist 
leadership.  
 The American communist press walked several lines in its coverage of Spain, 
among which was that between the optimism and pride it sought to engender in the 
aftermath of the electoral success of the People’s Front, on the one hand, and its desire to 
ensure that its readers remain vigilant against the threat of international fascism, on the 
other. Under the front-page banner headline, “People’s Front Wins Spanish Election,” a 
piece written the day after balloting titled “Fascists Threaten Civil War” warned of a 
potential “attempt by bloodshed to wipe out the smashing defeat delivered to [the right] 
by the overwhelming election victory of the anti-fascist People’s Bloc.”10 By the 
following month readers of the Daily Worker were reminded repeatedly that political 
violence in Spain was not merely potential, but actual. In describing fascist-instigated 
“terror in Spain,” the paper characterized the enemies of the People’s Bloc as 
“desperately seeking to provoke major incidents in their murder campaign … since the 
opening of the Cortes (parliament) yesterday.”11 And in its report of nine deaths and 
twenty injuries the previous week in violence perpetrated by the right, the Daily Worker 
described the responses to those provocations by “the masses” who gathered at the 
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German consulate in Madrid, where they shouted “Down with the Nazis!,” broke 
windows, and tore down and burned the Nazi flag.
12
 
 The concerns about international fascism that motivated the People’s Front 
policy, as well as its perceived relation to events in Spain, were evident in the anger 
demonstrated by supporters of the Republic in Madrid against the German government. 
And in early March the Nazis provided, in Hitler’s decision to violate Germany’s treaty 
obligations by moving his forces into the previously demilitarized Rhineland, ample 
justification for anxiety. Daily Worker readers were greeted on March 8 with a set of 
news articles announcing that “German troops officially crossed the River Rhine today 
for the first time in nearly seventeen years.” The next two-and-a-half years would witness 
continuous admonition in the proletarian press against complacency in the face of 
fascist/Nazi political and territorial aspirations around the globe. But although the paper 
noted that France, the nation whose territory was most immediately threatened by the 
Wehrmacht’s move into the Rhineland, had decided to request that the League of Nations 
impose sanctions against Germany, the emphasis of its coverage was on the presumed 
danger faced by the Soviet Union. The first piece on this topic, appearing on the front 
page, was headlined, “Hitler in Open Bid for War Alliance Against the Soviets.” Hitler’s 
move was cast primarily as a stratagem in his efforts to conclude a pact among the 
“imperialist bloc.”13 
                                                 
12
 “Nine Killed by Fascists in Spain,” Daily Worker, March 10, 1936. 
13
 “Hitler in Open Bid for War Alliance Against the Soviets,” “Nazi Troops Violate Pact by Occupation,” 
“War Chiefs Hold Secret Parley in Paris,” Daily Worker, March 8, 1936. 
44 
 
 Subsequent coverage of German and Italian aggression revealed the dual nature of 
the task of the international communist movement in the era of the People’s Front: 
consolidating and strengthening the ties of its adherents to the party and its Soviet 
mentor, while also drawing in left-wing and liberal allies by revealing the dangers of 
international fascism and offering the benefits of a broad alliance against it. On March 11 
readers were apprised of the scale and pace of German rearmament, noting that during 
the current year “the Reichswehr, or regular army, will grow from 100,000 into an army 
of 900,000 trained men.” The formation of “intensively trained and motorized” infantry 
and cavalry units, and a powerful air force, were described. And the near doubling of the 
number of ships in the German naval fleet was revealed as only the beginning of a build-
up that included submarine and aircraft carrier construction, forbidden by the Versailles 
Treaty.
14
 A Sunday edition, two-page photo montage, including an image of armed 
soldiers standing at attention in a line that seemingly extends endlessly, appeared under 
the portentous title, “Europe is on the march again. With Nazi troops in the Rhineland, a 
new war threatens to engulf the world once more.”15 
 The warning that fascism threatened the security of all of the peoples of the world 
often carried the corollary that the USSR was its primary target and that its protection 
was the paramount duty of all members of the global proletarian community. In an 
editorial appearing a day after its announcement of the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 
the Daily Worker interpreted Hitler’s message as, “World capitalism, unite against the 
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Soviet Union!” In response, it’s exhortation to the “toilers of America” was clear: “A 
victory for fascism, the destroyer of the trade unions, the enslavers of all toilers, … would 
be a catastrophe to the workers of the whole world. To defend the Soviet Union is to act 
to defend every one of your own rights and your own aspirations.”16 The following day, 
under the headline, “Hitler War Moves Demand Vigilant Defense of Soviet Union,” 
Daily Worker readers were advised that “the key to Hitler’s policy today is his attempt to 
break through the antagonisms which prevail between the imperialist powers by lining up 
all the imperialists into a united front against the Soviet Union.” Collaborative 
relationships already forming among Germany, Italy, and Japan, the paper warned, could 
be strengthened by the enlistment of Great Britain and France, where “powerful 
reactionary forces are trying to coerce their governments to join the fascist 
bandwagon.”17 American workers, the paper editorialized later that week, must “support 
the peace policy of the Soviet Union” because, according to a maxim that would 
ironically reappear time and again as volunteers’ rationale for service in Spain, “America 
will only be able to stay out of war by helping to keep the world out of war.”18    
 The recognition by its leaders and by the Comintern that the growth of CPUSA 
influence in American politics depended on formation of a united front of the left long 
predated the People’s Front policy. As far back as 1924 the Comintern directed the 
American party to seek contact with a wider section of the masses via formation of a 
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Farmer-Labor Party in support of the presidential candidacy of Wisconsin progressive 
Robert La Follette. Communist policy changes doomed that venture to failure but the idea 
became a recurrent one.
19
 Thus in late 1935, before any attention was focused on the 
upcoming elections in Spain, the Central Committee of the CPUSA adopted a resolution 
that asserted, “The building of a Farmer-Labor Party at the present time is the most 
burning need of the working class of America. … The building of such a party is the only 
way in which the working people of this country can seriously undertake to improve their 
intolerable conditions … and to ward off the growing menace of capitalist reaction, 
fascism and war.”20 In contrast to earlier, tentative forays by communists into coalition 
politics, the Seventh Comintern Congress was to instill in the global proletarian 
community a sense of urgency in organizing united efforts against reaction and war. 
 On March 20, the Daily Worker published an editorial that was also to appear in a 
forthcoming issue of The Communist International. It began its sweeping survey of the 
global scene with the optimistic proclamation that “the ardent call of the [Seventh 
Comintern] Congress for unity of action has found a mighty response among the working 
class and the broadest toiling masses in Europe, Asia, and America.” After warning 
against the growing danger of war, emphasizing the need for vigilance in the aftermath of 
anti-fascist electoral victories in France and Spain, and trumpeting the “magnificent 
achievements of Socialism in the USSR,” the piece sought to ensure that its readers, 
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perhaps dizzy from shifts in Comintern policies, perceived the revolutionary aims in the 
service of which the People’s Front strategy was purportedly enacted. In contrast to a 
coalition that cedes ideological leadership to the bourgeoisie or non-revolutionary left, 
“The people’s front policy … strengthens the working class, prepares the ground for the 
smashing and overthrowing of fascism …, and leads the toiling masses toward the 
decisive battles for their final emancipation.”21 People’s Front anti-fascism was thus to be 
understood by working-class revolutionaries as an incarnation of, and not a retreat from, 
proletarian internationalism.  
 In New York, the labor unions and working-class parties promulgated their joint 
program in a Manifesto of the United Labor May Day Committee, addressed “To the 
Workers of New York, Organized, Unorganized, Employed, Unemployed, Negro and 
White.” The exhortation to coalesce under “the banner of international solidarity” with 
workers around the world and by “a mighty outpouring of masses prove our 
determination to build a decent world” was followed by an outline of aims that 
represented a marriage of traditional domestic labor interests, anti-racism, working-class 
political unity, anti-fascism, and loyalty to the USSR: 
 Against War and Fascism; 
 Against Negro Discrimination; 
 For Unemployment Insurance; 
 For the Thirty-Hour Week; 
 For the Organization of the Unorganized; 
 For the Workers’ Rights Amendment; 
 For the American Youth Act; 
 For the Freedom of All Political Prisoners; 
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 For the Defense of Soviet Russia; 
 For a Farmer-Labor Party; 




The United Labor May Day Committee was chaired by Norman Thomas, longtime 
Socialist Party leader. While frequently quarreling with Thomas, his counterpart in the 
CPUSA, Earl Browder, came to be defined by his embrace of anti-fascist People’s Front 
politics. 
 In an article originally published in the November 1935 issue of the CPUSA 
theoretical journal The Communist, Browder sought to distinguish for American 
communists his (and the Comintern’s) vision of the united front from “the unprincipled 
government blocs that have been formed by the Social-Democratic Parties in Europe 
together with sections of the bourgeoisie.” In contrast to what he characterized as the 
“bankrupt and discredited practices of the Second International,” Browder described the 
united front as “a vehicle of collaboration between the organizations of the masses in 
struggle against capitalism, of all anti-fascist parties and groups, in the interests of the 
entire toiling population.”23 He would soon sound a more conciliatory note toward his 
fellow Marxists of the Second International, collaboration with whom would have its 
share of contention over the coming years. Among a group of articles under the headline, 
“Browder Stresses Need of Working Class Unity in Fight Against Menace of Fascist 
Drive Toward New World War,” the CPUSA leader urged socialists “to join the struggle 
                                                 
22
 “All Out on May 1 Against Fascism and War!,” Daily Worker, April 17, 1936. 
23
 “On United Front Government,” Daily Workder, May 7, 1936, excerpted from Earl Browder, “New Steps 
in the United Front,” The Communist, November 1935. 
49 
 
for the united front because it will strengthen both the Socialist Party and the Communist 
Party and thus strengthen the working class” in its “struggle … against fascism and 
war.”24  
 In CPUSA parlance the category of “fascism” came to denote not only its original 
Italian incarnation, along with German, Spanish, Portuguese, and Japanese (as well as 
several other national) variants, but also right-wing and even conservative movements 
and ideologies in the United States. Thus, Browder’s report on behalf of the Central 
Committee to the party’s Ninth National Convention was summarized as declaring “that 
the Landon-Hearst-Wall Street ticket [referring to the 1936 Republican presidential 
candidate and some of his prominent supporters] is the chief enemy of the … American 
people” and that “its victory would carry our country a long way on the road to fascism 
and war.” Turning to the anti-fascist People’s Front, the general secretary conceded “that 
the great majority are not yet prepared to turn to Socialism, as represented either by the 
Socialist Party or the Communist Party.” He explained that the CPUSA, therefore, came 
“forward with an immediate program which the masses are ready to support, … which is 
the program of a people’s front, a program for democratic rights, for prosperity and 
peace.”25 As the foregoing demonstrates, another line the American communist press 
walked – reflective of the dual imperatives faced by the movement’s leaders – was the 
one between portrayal of the People’s Front as broad-based and democratic versus 
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depiction of it as communist-led and revolutionary in intent. The former was vital for 
attracting allies and gaining influence, while the latter was necessary to reassure the 
party’s base of support that its ultimate goals remained those of the committed radical 
proletariat. Both would be needed to support the eventual Comintern-led initiative to save 
Republican Spain. 
 That same line applied to coverage of Spain, where opponents of the new 
government were keen to paint it as “red” and thus threatening to non-communists. 
Supporters, on the other hand, recognized the need to court bourgeois liberals and 
moderate socialists while simultaneously convincing the global revolutionary left of the 
Republic’s proletarian credentials and commitments. A few days following the elections, 
the Daily Worker reported from Madrid that “red flags appeared everywhere and the 
singing of the International could be heard. … Left wing adherents, especially the 
working class, … were overjoyed.”26 Four days later the paper reframed the election 
results for a broader constituency: “‘Save Spain from becoming a Soviet Russian Colony’ 
was the battle cry of the Spanish reactionaries in the election, last Sunday, of 473 
Deputies for the national Assembly. What they meant was: Save Spain for Fascism.”27  
 A good deal of the reporting from Spain between the elections and the rebellion 
nevertheless emphasized the ideological legitimacy of communist participation in the 
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People’s Front, and of the advances being achieved by it. Shortly after the election the 
Daily Worker published a photo of a rally in Madrid in which each member of the 
gathered throng has his or her clenched fist raised in the anti-fascist salute. The image is 
titled, “Red Election Rally in Spain,” and beneath it an article announces, “Spain 
Rejoices as People’s Bloc Frees 30,000 Political Prisoners.”28 Shortly thereafter the paper 
reported that the new Spanish government would reestablish diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union, which had been severed by the right in 1933.
29
 Subsequent pieces assured 
readers that “Spain’s Left coalition … continues to widen and press forward its victory 
against the reactionary cohorts” and that “fascist leaders are being rounded up and jailed 
as a result of a general strike in Madrid … which compelled the government to act 
against the fascists.”30 
 Clearly eager to dispel any potential doubt among the movement’s most ardent 
adherents regarding the consistency of communist policy, in May two dense and lengthy 
defenses of the People’s Front strategy were published in the Daily Worker. In the 
context of Manuel Azaña, a non-Marxist Republican, assuming the Spanish presidency, 
the paper outlined the advances being made by the working class and argued against 
claims that its revolutionary aims were being compromised: “Forged by the Communist 
Party, welded by revolutionary youth and tempered by the heroes of the Asturian Soviets, 
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the People’s Front became a definite instrument for carrying on the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution in Spain, leading toward the Socialist Revolution.”31 Commenting ten days 
later on the unification of the Socialist and Communist youth organizations, José Diaz, 
general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, published his assurance that “the 
proletariat and the working men of Spain are marching forward at a rapid pace on the 
path to organizational and political unity.” Invoking the expression “proletarian 
internationalism,” Diaz expressed confidence that the coalition strategy of “the 
Bolshevist Party” would lead to “victory for the revolution in Spain.”32 
 Emblematic of the strategy of soliciting support on the left for the Spanish 
government, while assuring activist communists of an ongoing commitment to 
revolutionary goals, is a “Letter from Spain,” authored by José Diaz and published in the 
July 7 issue of New Masses, an influential weekly magazine closely aligned with the 
CPUSA but with an ideologically broader readership than the Daily Worker. Opening 
with the rhetorical question, “Why is there such a campaign of slander against the 
People’s Front of Spain?” the author proceeds to summarize political events of the 
immediate past in support of his assertion that the People’s Front is “the hope of a new 
Spain.” He recounts the 1934 revocation of “all of the laws promulgated by the Republic 
which favored the interests of the workers and the poor people,” the restoration of 
confiscated property to the land barons and of the state subsidy to the Church, and the 
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repression of workers and leftists. Crediting the Communist Party with the innovation of 
anti-fascist unity, Diaz enumerates elements of the progressive agenda on which the 
coalition government was elected in February, asserting that “this program is a far cry 
from the ‘social revolution’ with which the Rightists are trying to scare the more 
moderate Republican camp, and to alienate certain democratic forces in other countries.” 
Although elimination of “the remnants of the middle ages” would seem a temperate goal, 
“the Rightists are obstinately bent on perpetuating” them, Diaz charges, by closing 
industrial plants and leaving land uncultivated “rather than give employment to the 
hungry thousands” and by planning assassinations of leftist leaders. While decrying 
efforts on the right to instill fear of “the specter of social revolution, of Bolshevism,” 
Diaz admits that “we Communists … fight for a Workers’ and Peasants’ Government in 
Spain.” However, he affirms full support of the government and the determination “that 
our country shall cease to be a semi-feudal realm under the despotic control of an ancient 
nobility.”33 It was to be on that basis that revolutionary Marxists and bourgeois 
republicans would join forces in defense of Spanish democracy.    
 Perhaps a more powerful means of instilling among American proletarian 
internationalists an allegiance to the Spanish Republic and a dedication to its protection 
was first-hand reporting of its achievements on behalf of those most in need. On May 27 
the Daily Worker published such an “account of the agrarian revolution in Spain” by 
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Georges Soria of the French Communist Party newspaper, L’Humanité.34 The June 16 
issue of New Masses carried a piece by the Soviet-Jewish journalist Ilya Ehrenbourg 
titled, “Spain’s Collective Farms.” After painting a picture of the still-feudal recent past 
in the district of Toledo, the author presents the uplifting news of the beginnings of land 
reform there, noting that “there are thirty-five collective farms; 2,400 families began life 
anew. Before, they had neither land nor mules – not even a corner they could call their 
own. They worked for the counts and marquis. … They paid them two or three pesetas a 
day – enough for watery soup with bread, rags and beds made of straw.” Since their 
seizure of the estates, Ehrenbourg avers, the peasants were asked whether they preferred 
to divide the land or work it collectively; an overwhelming majority voted for the latter. 
One “dark-eyed youth from Malapica” reportedly described himself to Ehrenbourg as a 
“kolkhoznik,” invoking the Russian word for Soviet collective farmers. The new regime 
had already brought a better life for the people: “The fields are serene. Sheep graze in the 
hills. The trees are budding. But,” readers are instructed, “this is a surface tranquility. 
There is tension everywhere.” The achievements of the People’s Front were surviving 
tenuously in the shadow of an armed and violent revanchist landowning class against 
which the Spanish masses would need to defend themselves.
35
 
 The shared identity of anti-fascist proletarian internationalists in the United 
States, which would be mobilized in the effort to aid the Spanish masses in their own 
defense, existed for many alongside a variety of other identities: Jewish, African 
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American, female, and Catholic among them. Although the efforts of the American 
communist press to bolster the allegiances of segments of these groups to the 
international working-class movement would accelerate in the context of the war in 
Spain, the importance of what today is termed “identity politics” was evident well before 
it. The commitment of the CPUSA to the rights and interests of black Americans was 
longstanding.
36
 And although coverage of the horrors of Italian fascist aggression in 
Ethiopia was of interest to all anti-imperialists in the United States, it had special 
resonance for African Americans. Referring to the significance of that war to all members 
of the diaspora, the Daily Worker declared, “In all parts of the world the African people 
have been roused to a renewed national consciousness, a stirring of revolt against their 
own imperialist oppressors, by Fascist Italy’s war on Ethiopia.”37 The paper editorialized 
the following month on the importance of uniting communist and socialist workers in 
support of Ethiopia’s defense, and subsequent photos in its pages demonstrated 
graphically the devastation being wrought by fascist bombs.
38
 
 As the foregoing demonstrates, readers of American communist publications – 
specifically the Daily and Sunday Worker and New Masses – were by the eve of the right-
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wing military rebellion in Spain immersed in a written culture of proletarian 
internationalism. During the era of the People’s Front policy, the membership and, even 
more, the influence of the CPUSA reached levels far in excess of anything in its previous 
history. The messages imparted to this now-sizable community of working-class anti-
fascists were stated and restated in various contexts and configurations and in aggregate 
were unmistakable in their conclusions: World-wide fascism was on the march and posed 
a grave threat to the aspirations of the proletariat, especially but not only by endangering 
the survival of the embodiment of those aspirations – the Soviet Union. The peril it 
represented necessitated a broad-based alliance of liberal and left forces to counter it. The 
People’s Front was a revolutionary movement through which support of left-leaning 
bourgeois governments served the ultimate aims of the radical proletariat and the Soviet 
Union. Finally – and crucially, as would shortly become evident – Spain was the crucible 
in which the struggle against fascism by the masses to sustain their legally achieved 
governing power would determine whether the forces of progress had a future, not just in 
Spain, but in this world.  
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CHAPTER 4: REBELLION, WAR, AND PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALIST 
RESPONSE 
 
 The recognition that political polarization and violence in Spain were escalating 
and that conditions were ripe for a coup attempt was shared by all who were following 
events there. That was as true of rank-and-file readers of the American communist press 
as it was of officials in the US State Department. A few days before the right-wing 
military pronunciamento that sparked civil war, the American ambassador in Spain 
reported to the secretary of state “that sensational developments during the past forty-
eight hours have tended to aggravate the serious political situation already existing as the 
result of continued social and political unrest,” and then proceeded to describe to his boss 
rumors of an impending rebellion by “Right extremists.”1 Four days later the ambassador 
wired Washington from San Sebastián, near the French border, to inform the secretary 
that a member of his staff in Madrid “telephones by special permission coup d’état 
planned for noon today. … Will wire when information more definite.”2  The first news 
seen by readers of the Daily Worker that a right-wing revolt had progressed from 
potential to actual was unwarrantedly optimistic in its conclusion. Over the dateline 
“Madrid, July 19” appeared the headline, “Spain Halts Fascist Coup.”3 
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 Beginning with such encouraging messages in the American communist press, 
this chapter will examine the period from the military insurrection of July 1936 through 
the arrival of the first units of the International Brigades in November of that year, 
signaling the overt internationalization of the war in Spain. It will continue to focus on 
the publications associated with the CPUSA as a means of understanding the ideological 
milieu in which members of the American proletarian internationalist community were 
steeped. Already primed to see events unfolding in Spain as highly consequential to their 
social class and political movement, events of the first several months of the war – and 
specifically their coverage in the communist press – solidified Spain as the central 
preoccupation of the American left. Building on the themes revealed and discussed in the 
previous chapter, CPUSA publications valorized the Spanish working class and its 
leadership in resisting the rebellion, while emphasizing the global stakes of the conflict. 
With the appearance of concrete Italian and German aid to the rebels, the non-
intervention policies of the western democracies became a recurring target and logical 
premise of Comintern and CPUSA efforts to mobilize political and material support for 
the loyalist side. The military threat to Madrid, which became evident by mid-September, 
provided the dire context within which the party and its press coverage redoubled efforts 
to solidify American workers’ allegiances to the anti-fascist cause and to broaden the 
scope of support for it. The foundation would thus be laid for the decisions of almost 
3,000 Americans to risk their lives in defense of the Spanish Republic and the 
international proletarian community it came to represent. 
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 The leaders of the military uprising, carried out on July 17 and 18 in Spanish 
Morocco and then in metropolitan Spain, had not anticipated the level of resistance that 
they encountered from the working class, and thus their path to power was not 
straightforward. Although regions of Spain historically associated with monarchism or 
with the Church lined up quickly with the rebels, support for the People’s Front 
government was stronger in more industrialized areas. Thus, the coup collapsed in places 
such as Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Málaga, and Bilbao.
4
 The valor of those elements 
of Spanish society that resisted the insurrection, along with confidence in their ultimate 
success, was the message of the communist press to its readers in the early days of the 
civil war. Invoking the slogan “Victory or Death,” reportedly adopted by supporters of 
the People’s Front, Daily Worker foreign editor Harry Gannes asserted, “From a military 
viewpoint, everything points to the complete failure of the Fascist uprising.”5 The 
following day credit for the rebellion’s prematurely reported defeat was revealed in a 
headline: “Spanish Labor Unity Breaks Backbone of Military Coup.”6 
 In a similar vein, the New Masses professed optimism in the face of “the long-
drawn-out Rightist campaign of civil disturbance and economic sabotage [that] has … 
culminated in a counter-revolutionary putsch.” Labeling “the forward-looking elements” 
of society “the only effective barrier to fascism,” the editorial closed with a tribute to the 
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People’s Front, whose “defense of the people” against fascism instantiated “the great 
lesson of our time: that the workers and their middle-class allies can by united action reap 
a bright future in a decaying world.”7 As important as it was for the communist press to 
credit the People’s Front coalition with the defense of the republic and of Spanish 
democracy, they wished to leave no doubt about the origin of the policy that led to its 
formation, or about the identity of the leadership of its efforts against fascism. A week 
into the rebellion, Daily Worker readers were introduced to La Pasionaria (“The 
Passionflower”), as Dolores Ibárruri, Communist member of the Cortes from Asturias 
and famously inspiring orator, was known. Before a crowd in Madrid she exhorted the 
people to “hold high your courage, as you did during the Asturias Revolution of October 
1934.” Warning against “the lies with which the Fascists wish to strike terror in the hearts 
of the workers,” she assured her audience that “we have absolute control of the 
government” and closed with, “Long live the People’s Front! Long live the Communist 
Party!”8 The following day the paper ran a lengthy profile of the miner’s daughter who 
became more than any other single person the face and voice of the Spanish proletariat 
before the international working class.
9
 And the day after that, La Pasionaria was linked 
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politically in an “intimate picture of revolutionary leaders” with José Diaz, general 
secretary of the Spanish Communist Party.
10
 
 The American communist press continued to portray the war in Spain in 
optimistic terms long after euphoria over the coup’s failure to capture control of the 
largest cities and the national government was giving way to recognition of the 
considerable military advantages enjoyed by the rebel forces. In that context, much of the 
coverage began to emphasize the conflict’s significance outside of Spain. A brief 
editorial in the Daily Worker could not have been more explicit about what it saw as the 
stakes for American workers: “The Spanish people are fighting for their lives and their 
freedom – but in so doing they are fighting for the lives and freedom of us all.”11  Two 
days later the paper’s editorial both broadened and shaped the appeal in a way that would 
come to characterize a major thrust of CPUSA strategy. After excoriating “the American 
reactionary papers” – particularly those published by Hearst – for their tilt toward the 
rebels, the Sunday Worker assimilated the defense of the Spanish Republic to both 
proletarian socialist and bourgeois democratic revolutionary heritages: “The heroism of 
the Spanish masses … will go down in history with all those great popular movements – 
such as the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the American Revolution of 1776 – which 
have given the common people freedom and independence.”12 And just as the Spanish 
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loyalists should be embraced as Iberian incarnations of Russian and American 
revolutionaries, defeat of their enemies would strike a blow against reaction at home: 
“For us a Spanish People’s Front victory means an improved position against our own 
Hearst-Landon-Liberty League-Morgan-duPont Fascists.”13    
 Although the American right would continue to be characterized as “fascist,” the 
American communist press devoted increasing attention to the more immediate threat of 
overt fascists and Nazis and the considerable resources being deployed by the Italian and 
German governments. The US secretary of state was informed of Rome’s deep 
geopolitical interest in Spain by his chargé d’affaires there. The diplomat indicated that 
“Italian officials are outspoken in their concern over the situation in Spain,” and in 
particular over “a very real threat of Bolshevism in the West” and the “constantly 
growing threat to the social order in Europe” that implied. In a separate telegram a week 
later he reported to Washington that “in the highest official circles here [Rome] the 
present conflict in Spain has been characterized as the crystallization of the opposition 
between the two main forces in Europe, namely, Fascism and Bolshevism.”14 As concrete 
evidence mounted that the rebel forces were being supplied by Italy and Germany, 
discourse reflected the recognition that the “civil war” in Spain was rapidly becoming an 
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international struggle, with commensurably heightened stakes.
15
 In that context, although 
communist publications would continue to argue that People’s Front anti-fascism was not 
an abdication of revolutionary Marxism, the Daily Worker editorialized – in 
contradistinction with the formulation of the Italian government reported above – that 
“the issue in Spain is not that of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat against Fascism. It is 
the issue of the will of the majority of the people for a democratic Republic.” The piece 
closed with an exhortation to leadership by the left of a broad movement: “Our task is to 
rally the American people on the side of democracy in Spain, on the side of the 
preservation of world peace. There is not much time to lose. ACT!”16 The party’s 
instructions would soon become more specific. 
 The international implications of the war in Spain were widely recognized by 
commentators from early on. A political cartoon in the Daily Worker of August 10 
depicted “The Spanish Bull” as a costume, the front half of which was inhabited by 
Hitler, with Mussolini filling out the rear (Figure 1). Roger Abbott of the New Masses 
warned that “a fascist victory” would not only entail misery for the Spanish people but 
would “render Spain a base of operations for German and Italian fascism, anxious to 
encircle the France of the People’s Front, and to goad Europe into a sanguinary war 
whose monstrous consequences would eventually roll across every country in the world, 
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including our own.”17 An editorial in the same issue asserted that “the second world war 
must be prevented” and demanded “that the government of the United States … should 
act before it is too late. It should join the powers seeking to preserve peace through 
collective security.”18 Readers of the magazine would have recognized that “collective 
security” in this context referred to Stalin’s quest for defense agreements between the 
Soviet Union and the western democracies. Although a Franco-Soviet pact had been 
signed in May 1935, a broader anti-fascist alliance that included Great Britain was not 
achieved.
19
 More relevant here is that aid for the Spanish Republic would not be 
forthcoming from the western democracies, and the asymmetry between the warring sides 
in Spain that engendered became a major issue for Soviet foreign policy, the Comintern, 
and the international proletarian community.  
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Figure 1: The international implications of the war in Spain, and specifically the relationship between the 
rebel side and the fascist governments of Europe, were important themes of coverage in the communist 
press from the beginning. (Daily Worker, August 10, 1936. Reproduced with permission, Tamiment 
Library, New York University.) 
  
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the People’s Front policy of the Comintern was first 
applied in France and Socialist Premier Léon Blum, head of the liberal-left government 
there, clearly wished to aid his sister government in Spain. At a cabinet meeting in Paris 
on August 1, Blum argued that France not only had an obligation to extend help to the 
Spanish Republic, but that it was also in its self-interest. It was at that point, however, 
already evident that the more conservative British government would not follow suit and 
would not back France should a general war result from its intervention in Spain. In that 
circumstance the more cautious members of the French cabinet prevailed in obstructing 
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any significant military assistance to Madrid. Instead, a policy of “non-intervention” was 
proposed by the French government. The Italians and Germans, already by that time 
arming the rebels, prevaricated, but by August 21, France, Great Britain, Germany, and 
Italy had all ostensibly agreed to refrain from intervention in the Spanish Civil War. At a 
meeting of the Socialist Federation of the Seine on September 6, Blum justified to an 
initially hostile crowd his government’s actions: “I know you want arms for the Spanish 
Government. But if we send them other countries will help the rebels. … What would be 
the result of an arms race in Spain? … Non-intervention has probably already avoided a 
European war.”20 The meaninglessness of agreements with Mussolini and Hitler had not 
yet become evident to all, but the sham of “non-intervention” would soon become a 
fixture of the proletarian internationalist narrative. 
 The Soviet position on non-intervention was complicated. As noted in Chapter 2, 
Stalin recognized that Soviet security could be affected adversely by either creation of 
another fascist foothold in Europe or by establishment of a revolutionary regime on the 
Iberian Peninsula that would frighten mainstream western public opinion and thereby 
damage prospects for a broad international anti-fascist alliance. The solution to that 
dilemma would entail the USSR remaining a vocal supporter of the People’s Front 
government, agreeing to the French non-intervention proposal, sending humanitarian aid 
to Spain, and – only after it became evident that Italy and Germany were violating the 
agreement – supplying the loyalists with arms, though not nearly to the extent that the 
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fascist powers were aiding the rebels.
21
 Most importantly, the Comintern was charged 
with rallying members of the international proletarian community to the cause of the 
Spanish Republic in increasingly concrete ways. As early as August 11 the Secretariat of 
the Executive Committee of the Comintern sought pilots for service in Spain. In a cipher 
message from Moscow, CPUSA General Secretary Earl Browder was advised, “The 
governmental army in Spain is in a great want of aviators. If you have aviators who 
sympathize with the Party, necessary urgently to send them to Spain.”22 Soon, communist 
parties would be expected to supply recruits for a Comintern army to fight in Spain. 
Membership in the community of international proletarian anti-fascists demanded great 
commitment and, for many, it would come to entail great sacrifice. 
 Not coincidentally, the attention paid by the Comintern to Spain was shared by 
the CPUSA. Included in the August 13 meeting of its Politburo was a discussion of the 
policy it would pursue. The conclusions of that deliberation contained two parts, the first 
of which related to the demands the party was to make on the Roosevelt administration. It 
should emphasize that the government in Madrid was “legitimately established, … 
democratic, and friendly” to the United States, and that it was “engaged in suppressing an 
insurrection by fascist, monarchist elements.” Moreover, “the attempted intervention by 
Hitler and Mussolini are [sic] not only giving aid to the rebels in Spain against a friendly 
government but may also result in strengthening these two powers for the outbreak of a 
world war which they are preparing.” Therefore, “since the United States is vitally 
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interested in seeing that the manoeuvers of Hitler and Mussolini do not succeed,” the 
party called upon the president “to check and prevent these war makers from carrying out 
their plan.” The Politburo went on to insist that the US government “throw the full weight 
of this country on the side of the people and against the attempts of Germany and Italy in 
Spain,” but stopped short of specifying the form such a policy should take.23 
 The second prong of the party’s initiative on Spain related to “the question of 
independent action of the workers,” asserting that such action must express “moral and 
political sympathy with the Spanish people against the reactionaries and fascists and 
rendering all support, exerting all possible pressure on Roosevelt.” It went on to instruct 
the party “to attempt to organize demonstrations immediately in front of the Italian and 
German Embassies [sic] throughout the country protesting their intervention and 
mobiliz[ing] the masses in support of peace and for the democratic government in 
Spain.”24 The following day, under the headline, “United States Must Not Aid Fascist 
Mutineers Against Democratic, Friendly Spain,” a lengthy Daily Worker editorial urged 
its readers that “great mass demonstrations of protest before the German Nazi and Italian 
fascist consulates must answer the Hitler-Mussolini intervention in Spain.” “Stop the 
brutal attack on Spanish democracy!” it insisted, and “Halt the war planes of the fascist 
plotters against the peace of the world!” Demanding that the administration “place the 
full weight of this country’s influence in opposition to the German Nazi and Italian 
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fascist intervention in Spain,” the paper presented to the American communist 
community the policy, and nearly verbatim language, adopted by their party.
25
 
 Further discussion at the August 13 CPUSA Politburo meeting revealed the 
governing body’s determination to increase the visibility of the party’s campaign on 
behalf of the Spanish loyalists. The complaint of a “lack of activities in support of the 
struggle of the Spanish masses” was tied to the astonishing assertion of a “lack of much 
news [on Spain] in the DW [Daily Worker].” In response to “a tremendous amount of 
demands for greater activity than have been carried through so far,” the Politburo was 
informed that members of the party were “trying to get Madison Square Garden for next 
Wednesday night, with perhaps Comrade H. speaking.”26 Five days after the Politburo 
meeting, a Daily Worker headline enjoined readers to “Pack Garden Rally Tonight for 
Spanish People’s Front,” noting that the paper’s editor, Clarence Hathaway (presumably 
“Comrade H.”), would be there to “analyze the problems of the civil war in Spain.” That 
piece shared the page with three news articles on the war in Spain, along with an editorial 
whose title pleaded for readers to “Aid Spanish People to Save Democracy and World 
Peace” and whose text asked them, “What are you doing, comrades and friends, to help 
save Spanish democracy? What are you doing to aid these heroic fighters, on the plains 
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and in the hills of Spain?”27 One may reasonably conclude that no one in New York or 
Moscow complained that the struggle in Spain was being ignored that day. 
 Throughout the war the overt pleas for aid to Spain emanating from the CPUSA 
largely related to funds and non-military supplies. The communist press frequently 
carried reports of fund-raising events and donations by labor unions and other 
organizations, holding up as models those sectors of the proletarian community that were 
doing their parts in the international struggle. An early example appeared on August 13 
under the headline, “Groups Rush Funds to Aid Spanish People.” The article proclaimed 
that “support for the Spanish people in their fight against fascism continued to roll in both 
in word and deed yesterday.” Among the organizations lauded were the Grocery, Dairy 
and Fruit Clerks union, whose executive committee voted a $5,000 donation to “the 
Spanish anti-fascists,” as well as Locals 144 and 21 of the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union. The piece closed by informing readers that “the Hospital Employees 
Union, local 171 of the Building Service Employees International Union, today 
announced that one of their most poorly paid members had contributed $25 to aid the 
People’s Front of Spain.”28 The message of international working-class solidarity being 
both a high moral virtue and an expectation of the community was clear. 
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 It was also evident that much more would be needed to save the Spanish Republic 
from the powerful and well financed coalition of reactionary Spaniards and foreigners 
arrayed against it. The Daily Worker editorialized that “support for the People’s Front has 
not been as speedy and as large as the situation requires. The enemies of democracy in 
Spain must be met by the friends of democracy around the world! Material support must 
not fail to come!” That plea was coupled to the observation that the non-intervention 
policy proposed by the French and about to be formalized among the European powers 
was detrimental to the republican cause: “Neutrality is turning out to be an economic 
blockade against the People’s Front and underhand aid to the Spanish Fascists. … The 
chief need of the hour is to rally all possible forces … AGAINST FASCIST 
INTERVENTION and to BREAK THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE against the Spanish 
People’s Front.”29 The American embargo on the sale of arms to Spain that was 
introduced in 1936 would persist for the duration of the war, despite the efforts of the 
working-class left, in conjunction with those of liberals and intellectuals, to have it lifted. 
Prior to the neutrality legislation of 1937, which extended coverage of prior neutrality 
laws to include civil wars, the arms embargo was a “moral” and not a legal one. It 
reflected widespread isolationist sentiment in the United States, even among those whose 
sympathies were with the republicans in Spain.
30
 The disastrous effects for the loyalist 
side of the asymmetrically implemented international non-intervention agreement were 
among the protracted refrains of the communist press.  
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 On August 25 readers of the Daily Worker learned of Soviet Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov’s “whole-hearted support of the French Government’s 
efforts to save European peace.” On the previous day he had signed an agreement to 
refrain from exporting war materials to Spain in the context of German and Italian 
indications of their willingness to do likewise.
31
 Four days later, however, an editorial 
contended, “In the Spanish situation we cannot be ‘neutral.’ … Hitler and Mussolini are 
NOT neutral. They talk of an ‘embargo’ on arms to Spain – but continue to furnish such 
arms and ammunition to the fascist mutineers.” Returning to the message determined by 
the Politburo earlier in the month, the paper decried the attempts of “the international 
gangsters” – among whom they counted Hearst along with Hitler and Mussolini – to 
“terrorize the world.” It asserted that “the American people will not be terrorized. From 
their ranks comes this demand on Roosevelt: ‘Break the blockade against the Spanish 
government! Help the Spanish democracy!’”32 A couple weeks later, American 
communists were assured that their counterparts in France had drawn the same 
conclusion. The editor of L’Humanité was quoted in a Sunday Worker editorial as having 
declared, “It is false to pose the dilemma of ‘neutrality or war.’ The blockade of Spain’s 
regular government, when fascist powers are aiding the rebellion, itself constitutes 
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intervention against a friendly republic.”33 And later that week the Daily Worker insisted, 
simply, “Away with the fiction of ‘neutrality’! Away with this fraud!”34 
 Members of the radical proletarian community were thus reminded repeatedly that 
in Spain – as in so many other arenas over the lifespan of the international workers’ 
movement – their struggle was not a fair one. That argument was no less emotional for 
being founded on facts. A good deal of the coverage of Spain in the communist press 
kindled and nurtured ties between readers and their presumed counterparts in Spain. An 
editorial insisted that “the fight in Spain is crucial for the labor movement of the entire 
world” as “the fascist rebels have already declared [that] they intend to do what the 
fascists in Germany, Italy and Austria have done: smash the trade unions.”35 The Daily 
Worker made clear that the cause of Spain was a family affair, with considerable 
attention paid to it on the “women’s page” and eventually in the section designed for 
children. “When the daily papers arrive the kids of Camp Meadowbrook get excited,” 
despite the fact that “not that many of them can read,” a mid-August article reports. 
“‘What’s the latest news from Spain?’ they want to know. ‘Are the fascists from Italy and 
Germany still sending planes to kill the Spanish workers?’” they purportedly ask. The 
piece goes on to print letters from the campers about their fund-raising project for the 
Spanish cause, one of which is reproduced in the handwriting of its young author, Naomi 
Docker. It begins, “Dear Comrades and fellow workers,” and proceeds with an inspiring 
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message: “I hope you are gaining ground and that there will be a soviet spain. We have 
ten dollars from selling leminade and cholit. We give it to you for your freedom. I hope 
you win the dirty fashists.” She signs it “an amarican comrade.”36   
 Among the most effective means of engendering a sense of immediacy employed 
by the communist press was the increasingly frequent appearance of eyewitness accounts. 
A Sunday feature titled, “Murder – Behind the Red Cross” recounted the treachery of a 
contingent of rebel fighters in the words of villagers who witnessed it: “The fascists rode 
into town in trucks, bearing the Red Cross Emblem … suddenly the sides dropped down 
and machine guns began to spray bullets in all directions.”37 Several days later, beneath a 
photo of a column of militiamen and women with their fists raised in the anti-fascist 
salute, reportedly just before they left for the Somosierra Front, a lengthy piece 
emphasized the political commitment, courage, resolve, and human likeability of the 
workers-cum-soldiers the reporter had accompanied before mailing his dispatch back to 
New York more than two weeks previously.
38
 American workers were also from time to 
time given glimpses of the war as seen through the eyes of Spanish loyalist journalists. 
On September 20, Sunday readers received a sampling from three different Spanish 
writers, compiled and translated by the veteran CPUSA leader Harrison George. They 
appeared on the same page as an image of a man, in front of farm animals, with a rifle 
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slung over one shoulder and the opposite fist raised in salute. The caption reads, “A 
peasant guards his sheep – and the Republic.”39 
 By the fall of 1936, the CPUSA and its allied organizations had expanded the 
number of venues in which they published written materials on the situation in Spain. 
Pamphlets, whose numbers would proliferate the following year, provided readers 
information in a format that allowed greater breadth of coverage than individual 
newspaper or magazine articles but was nevertheless convenient and easy to read. Among 
the first such productions reported the findings of a September visit to Spain by an 
“International Youth Commission” that represented a number of leftist organizations in 
the United States, Canada, and Cuba. The tone of the document was set early by its 
description of arrival in Spain from France on foot, via a railroad tunnel through the 
foothills of the Pyrenees: “Coming out of the tunnel into the Spanish sunlight made us 
feel that we were being born again.”  The pamphlet briefly summarized the history of 
Spanish politics and the war and outlined the components of the People’s Front. Finding 
confidence and high morale among the people, the author enthused that “no adjectives are 
needed to describe the courage and conviction which hold them together against the 
rebels when one realizes the terrific technical odds against them.” If those odds were to 
be overcome, it would be attributable in no small measure to the unity of young people. 
Asked, “What is the most important thing young people in each country can do for the 
cause of democracy?” the leader of the Spanish Socialist Youth organization replied, 
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“without hesitation, ‘Unite!’” That message was translated into the pamphlet’s 
conclusion that it was “the responsibility of all the young people in the world to stand 
together and act with strength in behalf of [the] ideals we cherish.”40  
 The tone of the communist press began to change by late September. Although 
the themes of its coverage of Spain described above – including professed optimism at 
ultimate victory despite a decidedly uneven playing field – continued, a sense of urgency 
became ever more evident. With the rebel forces under Franco advancing toward 
Talavera de la Reina, the only significant town standing between them and Madrid, the 
Sunday Worker warned in a headline, “Decisive Fight Looms Near Talavera Area.”41 An 
editorial on the same day was titled, “They Shall Not Pass!,” invoking the rallying cry of 
La Pasionaria (“¡No Pasarán!”) that became one of the most recognizable and frequently 
repeated slogans of the loyalist side. The article asserted that “the civil war in Spain is 
rapidly approaching a turning point,” adding that “the Spanish masses … are fighting 
valiantly but they need our help, the help of every man or woman who values peace and 
democracy.”42 A week later, on the day Franco’s forces relieved the loyalist siege of the 
Alcázar fortress in Toledo, the Sunday Worker identified, in the title of an editorial, a 
“Critical Period Ahead,” as Madrid prepared to be defended by a People’s Army against 
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“the fascist legions, merciless hordes of Moorish tribesmen and cut-throat 
Legionnaires.”43 
 As the defense of Madrid loomed and incontrovertible evidence accumulated that 
the Italians and Germans were aiding the rebel forces and that their interventions could 
well prove decisive, on September 29 the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union approved significant military assistance to the Spanish loyalists. The vessel 
Komsomol departed Odessa with a cargo of heavy weapons that arrived in Cartagena on 
October 15.
44
 In a New Masses article published while the Komsomol was en route to 
Spain, British writer John Strachey justified earlier Soviet agreement to the French non-
intervention proposal on the grounds that “Soviet leaders are guardians of the first 
socialist economic system which has ever existed in human history; as such they carry an 
enormous responsibility upon their shoulders,” adding, “To endanger that system lightly 
would be a crime.” Nevertheless – continuing to conflate international proletarian and 
Soviet interests – he went on to assert that “the safety of socialism in the Soviet Union 
itself demands that fascism should not be allowed to destroy all of the Soviet Union’s 
allies,” and identified the duty of the Moscow government to “keep the sword erect” as 
“the hour of decision is approaching very rapidly.”45 As introduced above, however, the 
centerpiece of Stalin’s strategy for Spain was a worldwide proletarian campaign on 
behalf of the republic, orchestrated by the Comintern and its constituent parties and 
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designed to prioritize Soviet interests and implement Soviet directives. Although 
Moscow supplied over eight hundred planes and four hundred tanks to the cause of the 
Spanish government, the face of its intervention would be international, not Russian.
46
 
 Pursuant to instructions from the Soviet Politburo, in early October the Secretariat 
of the Comintern Executive Committee ordered communist parties to engage “in the 
recruitment of volunteers with military training among the workers of various countries, 
in order to send them to Spain.” Later that month CPUSA General Secretary Earl 
Browder was directed to organize recruitment of volunteers and supplies of weapons 
from the United States, and to solicit help from communist parties in Latin America.
47
 
Although the American radical working-class community was already well informed 
about and emotionally involved in the cause of Republican Spain, the defense of Madrid, 
in the context of new Comintern and CPUSA expectations, would prompt intensified 
coverage in the communist press. A September 30 piece in the Daily Worker asked, “Will 
Madrid be the Spanish Verdun, or will it share the fate of the Paris Commune?”48 Both 
the heroism and the working-class identities of its defenders were frequently invoked, in 
pointed contrast to the perfidious and foreign-backed fascist attackers.
49
 Readers of the 
Daily Worker learned that, although the Emergency Defense Committee in Madrid had 
declared a “state of siege” the previous day, the Spanish capital was swept with a “do or 
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die spirit.” The same issue carried a report of a demonstration in New York’s Union 
Square in support of the Spanish people and against the US neutrality policy, as well as a 
political cartoon depicting a worker wielding a hammer while German and Italian 
warplanes drop bombs on “neutrality” (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: With German and Italian intervention revealing neutrality policies to be a sham, workers were 
implored to support their imperiled counterparts in Spain. (Daily Worker, October 10, 1936. Reproduced 
with permission, Tamiment Library, New York University.) 
    
 Being informed about the struggle of the Spanish people, as well as its historical 
background and future implications, was an expectation of members of the American 
proletarian community. An entire page of the Sunday Worker of October 11 was devoted 
to a test for readers: “What Do You Know About Spain?” They were instructed that 
events there were “of vital concern not only to all Europe, but to America, to YOU,” and 
asked, “Are you fully equipped to take part in these discussions [of the war in Spain], to 
explain it to others who do not know or have the wrong information about it?” The right-
80 
 
hand column of the page contained fifteen questions by which readers could test their 
knowledge, many of which were as declarative as they were interrogative. One of them, 
for example, asked, “What confidential document published by the London News 
Chronicle on August 18, 1936, proved that the Nazis had a vast network of terrorist and 
espionage organizations in Spain?” Rather than supplying the correct responses to the 
questions, the key at the bottom indicated the page numbers in the book Spain in Revolt, 
authored by two foreign editors of the Daily Worker, on which the answers could be 
found. And, conveniently, a cut-out coupon on the bottom of the page allowed readers 
who mailed it in with two dollars to receive both the book and a six-month subscription 
to the Sunday Worker. That issue also contained, on the “women’s page,” the winning 
letter in the paper’s “great anti-war contest.” Phoebe Ray’s successful entry implored, 
“We must organize every woman, every man, every child for the fight against war and 
fascism. … We shall organize into a strong and mighty army, that the enemy should fear 
our power. We must start it now!” Included among the venues in which readers were 




 No reader of the communist press could have been unaware of, or unconcerned 
about, the impending battle for Madrid. In the October 27 issue of the New Masses, 
Young Communist League leader Gil Green compared this anticipated turning point of 
the war to a milestone of American history: “Spain faces its Gettysburg. If the masses of 
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the world come to its defense with every form of material aid, the Spanish toilers will win 
their victory over fascism. The question before every self-conscious worker and 
intellectual, before every lover of liberty and freedom, is to come to the aid of the 
Spanish people. … We must not fail!”51 Several days previously readers of the Daily 
Worker were informed of an upcoming appearance at Madison Square Garden of three 
Spanish representatives of the loyalist cause – a Catholic priest, a leader of the Left 
Republican Party, and a woman member of the Cortes – who would tell “the story of the 
epic struggle of the Spanish masses against the mad-dogs of fascism.” A brief appeal for 
recruitment of new members to the Communist Party, appearing in that same issue, was 
emotively headed, “Spain Speaks to You.”52 And the following day, Earl Browder spoke 
to a national radio audience on “The American People and Spain.”53 Communist 
leadership of the movement to save the Spanish Republic was now unmistakable.  
 Browder contended that “it is the duty of every American worker and progressive 
to help the Spanish people defeat the fascist invasion.” In a foreshadowing of the party’s 
strategy for the remainder of the war, the general secretary and presidential candidate 
emphasized themes of the loyalist cause with which most Americans – and certainly all 
liberals and progressives – would agree.54 Three nights following Browder’s address an 
estimated 20,000 people packed Madison Square Garden where they reportedly cheered 
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the representatives of the republican side who spoke there; impressive photos from the 
rally showing the throng and the speakers appeared in the paper on October 29.
55
 And on 
the day following the Madison Square Garden mass meeting, Spanish Premier Francisco 
Largo Caballero’s direct plea for aid from America was published in the Daily Worker. In 
an emotional message the leader of the left-wing faction of the Socialist Party spoke both 
to the radical proletarian and broader progressive communities: “I appeal to your 
working-class solidarity. I appeal to the instincts of freedom in the great American 
people. I appeal to your hearts and to your hands. Believe in us. Have faith in us. We are 
your brothers.” Invoking an expression that would be repeated by proletarian 
internationalists countless times over the coming two years, the Spanish leader entreated, 
“Make Madrid the tomb of fascism.”56  
 The task of assembling and leading an effective movement in support of the 
loyalist cause weighed on the CPUSA. Despite the quantity of information already being 
published on the situation in Spain, members of the Politburo expressed at their October 
30 meeting that they “have not brought enough material into the press.” With respect to 
“the building up of a broad mass movement … [h]ere we have the beginning in the 
meeting of New York at the Garden and the tour, which is being developed throughout 
the country by the representatives who came from Spain.” But much more work 
remained, and “it will be the Party which will have to do much of [it], building up the 
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meetings, setting up the necessary broad committee, etc.” In addition to the considerable 
organizational work they faced, members of the Politburo also identified several 
obstacles to their success on this project. Broadening the coalition of anti-fascist activists 
would entail concerted appeals to demographic groups that had been underrepresented in 
their movement. Foremost among these were Catholics. As discussed above, anti-
clericalism was a long-time staple of the Spanish left and the American Catholic press 
emphasized in its coverage the church burnings, rape of nuns, and killing of priests that 
had occurred in the republican zone. Moreover, depiction of the war as a consequence of 
an international Bolshevik conspiracy augmented the anti-communism already espoused 
by many Catholics. To counter such sentiment the Politburo called for appeals to be 
“issued to the Catholic masses directly.”57 
 During the previous month, in an apparent concession to People’s Front comity, 
the front page of the Daily Worker softened the explicitness of the newspaper’s partisan 
affiliation. Under the name of the paper had long been the phrase, “Central Organ 
Communist Party U.S.A. (Section of Communist International),” and the universally 
recognizable hammer-and-sickle logo was featured prominently between the words 
“Daily” and “Worker.” On September 21, however, the front page subtitle became 
“Peoples Champion of Liberty, Progress, Peace and Prosperity” and the hammer and 
sickle disappeared (but remained, albeit in smaller font, on the masthead of the editorial 
page). The vaunted atheism of communist ideology likewise gave way to the practical 
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need of the party to court the considerable population of American working-class 
Catholics. Decrying “fake stories of ‘Red atrocities against the Catholic Church in 
Spain’” that were running in conservative papers in Europe and America, the Sunday 
Worker distinguished the “high dignitaries of [the] church, backed by their master at the 
Vatican, [who] are working hand in glove with fascist butchers to slaughter Spain’s 
people” from “true Catholics in Spain [who] are fighting for the People’s Front and 
giving their lives to defend Democracy.” Recognizing that Catholic readers might be 
hesitant to accept the theological pronouncements of communist editorial writers, the 
piece’s author closed with a quote from Father Luis Sarasola’s speech at Madison Square 
Garden two weeks previously: “We are struggling to maintain the legal government of 
the nation because this is the duty of all citizens and of all Catholics.”58 
 That struggle was reaching a crescendo. By the first of November rebel troops had 
advanced as far as the western and southern outskirts of Madrid, and would soon be 
reinforced by the German Condor Legion, eager to test in battle its advanced weaponry. 
On November 6 the government of the republic moved to Valencia, much further from 
the battle lines, leaving General José Miaja and the Junta de Defensa (Defense Council) 
in charge of Madrid’s protection.59 The desperation of the situation was evident in the 
succinct and insistent Daily Worker editorial of November 9, which began dramatically: 
“Heroic Madrid is desperately but stubbornly holding out against the fascist hordes who 
have sworn to make the streets run with rivers of blood of the city’s defenders.” 
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Nevertheless, readers were assured, the Spanish people remained “determined to be 
victorious in this battle for democracy and for world peace.” That outcome, however, 
would depend on the responses of members of the international proletarian community: 
“Your help must go to embattled Spain! … Support the Soviet Union’s great efforts to 
smash down the ‘neutrality’ farce. … The fact that the people of Spain are giving their 
life’s blood to defend democracy must be our main concern. Communists, Socialists, 
trade union members, liberals, progressives, in every organization – unite your ranks to 
help Spain NOW!”60  
 Help – and not only of the material sort – from the international working class 
was in fact arriving, albeit not yet in significant quantity from the United States. The first 
units of the Comintern-sponsored International Brigades (IBs) arrived in Madrid on 
November 8. Initially taken by the Spaniards who greeted their arrival with shouts of 
“¡Salud!, ¡Salud!” to be Russians, that first contingent was largely composed of French, 
German, and Italian anti-fascists.
61
 By the time the IBs were withdrawn in late 1938, 
approximately 35,000 volunteers from fifty-three different countries had served the 
loyalist side.
62
 Responsibility for coordinating recruitment fell to the leaders of the 
French Communist Party, and roughly a quarter of the membership of the IBs was of 
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 In its valorization of the defense of Madrid, the Sunday Worker’s 
mention of the “new International Volunteers consisting of the Rome Battalion …, the 
Paris Battalion …, and the Thaelmann Battalion” was scant.64 Soon, however, the 
heroism and selfless dedication of the global army that answered the call of its political 
party and social class would be legendary. By the start of the final week of November the 
rebel assault on Madrid was exhausted and the city remained in republican hands.
65
 The 
gruesome war of which it was part, however, continued. And nearly 3,000 American 
radical proletarian internationalists – who had been immersed in a political world in 
which the war in Spain was for months on end the paramount topic of the time – would 
shortly embark on their quest to steer its outcome.  
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CHAPTER 5: CIVIL WAR TO INTERNATIONAL WAR AND AMERICAN 
PROLETARIAN COMMITMENT 
 
 The arrival of the International Brigades in Madrid marked a turning point – both 
militarily and psychologically – of the war. Not only would the rebel fight for Spain’s 
largest cities and seat of government be far more protracted than observers thought, and 
loyalists feared, during the fall of 1936; what had been at least putatively a civil war was 
now an unabashedly international one. Evidence of increasingly concerted German, 
Italian, and Portuguese intervention had, of course, existed for months, in blatant 
contravention of the non-intervention agreement among the European powers. In 
addition, some foreigners had enlisted in the various militias organized by Marxist, 
anarchist, and republican groups immediately following the start of hostilities. Many of 
those volunteers were political refugees from fascist countries, and some had come to 
Barcelona to participate in the People’s Olympiad – an alternative to the games taking 
place in Hitler’s Berlin – during the summer of 1936.1 Nevertheless, the sights and 
sounds of the newly arrived international proletarian unit surprised and heartened 
residents of Madrid in the early morning hours of November 8: 
 In the Plaza de Antón Martín, … Alvaro Delgado heard a song he didn’t 
 recognize, [and] saw a group of well-uniformed soldiers wearing large blue berets 
 and pulling machine-guns on rubber wheels behind them. They didn’t look at all 
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 like the militiamen in overalls the boy was used to seeing. … They were singing 





 Early the following month the US State Department was officially apprised by its 
representative in Barcelona of the widening international dimensions of the war: “I am 
reliably informed that during the past few weeks there have been increasing quantities of 
munitions arriving from France. … Some thousands of foreign volunteers have also 
arrived: these are mostly French but consist also of Russians, Germans, Italians, Poles, 
Belgians, and other aliens of radical sympathies.” The American consul went on to 
express “little doubt that these volunteers have been a factor in prolonging the resistance 
in Madrid, and from this vantage point the struggle appears to be presenting a more 
international aspect than at any time hitherto.”3 In the very near future the appearance of 
fighters with “radical sympathies” from the United States would be the subject of 
communications between officials in Washington and their envoys in Spain.  
 As introduced in Chapter 4, the decision of the Soviet Politburo to direct the 
Comintern to sponsor the formation of the International Brigades resulted in instructions 
to CPUSA General Secretary Earl Browder to recruit volunteers, as well as procure 
supplies, from America. The bulk of the effort expended by the party to fulfill that 
mandate, at least through the end of 1936, was indirect and consisted of continuous 
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education and propaganda in the communist press, organization of mass rallies and 
demonstrations, and sponsorship of lectures by American and Spanish observers and 
participants. In those and other ways they succeeded in making the war in Spain the 
personal cause of members of the proletarian internationalist community, along with 
many of their allies on the non-communist left. As Malet, in his recent study of the 
phenomenon of foreign participation in civil wars, points out, the volunteers on the 
loyalist side in the Spanish Civil War were “True Believers who view[ed] the local civil 
conflict as one front [of] a larger transnational struggle in defense of their group … 
having been told that they faced an existential threat at the hands of the other [side].”4 
The CPUSA was not the only source of information on which American “true believers” 
based their commitments, but it was certainly the most persistent and effective one. 
 This chapter, which begins with the overt internationalization of the war, carries 
the story of the role of the American communist press in consolidating and mobilizing the 
proletarian internationalist community and its allies in defense of the Spanish Republic 
into the early months of 1937. As argued below, although the conflict would continue for 
another two years, and remnants of the International Brigades would remain for most of 
that time, most American volunteers had reached their decisions to fight in Spain by early 
1937. During the interval examined in this chapter, the communist press continued to 
emphasize the dangers of international fascism and the virtues of anti-fascism and its 
communist and Soviet sponsors. Efforts at broadening the anti-fascist coalition under 
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communist leadership intensified, with the CPUSA portraying communism as the 
contemporary embodiment of the traditional American political values of independence 
and democracy. As will be discussed, although periodicals associated with the party 
continued, and even amplified, their coverage of the war in Spain, efforts at recruitment 
of supporters and volunteers was increasingly diversified, with the establishment of a 
variety of organizations affiliated with but nominally distinct from the CPUSA. Among 
their means of communication was the propaganda pamphlet, whose numbers 
proliferated during 1937. The results of these initiatives are examined below in the 
profiles of the American contingents of the International Brigades. Finally, the hypothesis 
that communist press coverage supplied a conceptual and linguistic framework within 
which members of the proletarian internationalist community and their allies formulated 
their own beliefs and decisions regarding Spain is tested through examination of both 
contemporaneous and retrospective testimonies of American volunteer fighters.    
 To the various themes of communist press coverage of Spain chronicled in 
previous chapters was, in late 1936, added another: the valor of the international 
defenders of the republic. In his update on the global stakes of the war, John Strachey tied 
the hope conferred by the arrival of the volunteers to the heroism of the country behind 
their efforts. Noting that the interventions of the fascist states “have now been answered 
by important contingents of men and material coming to the aid of the Spanish 
government … from every country in Europe” with “the powerful backing of the Soviet 
Union,” the author averred that “surely everyone can see that the preservation of the 
Soviet Union and the destruction of the fascist tyrannies are not two causes, that there is 
91 
 
no question of putting the interests of one before the other. They are the same cause.”5 As 
with so many other aspects of Soviet policy toward Spain, the communist press needed to 
walk a delicate line in its coverage of the International Brigades and the inspiration 
behind them. Historian R. Dan Richardson observes, “The Communists tried to have it 
both ways: credit for the Brigades and their glorious exploits and, at the same time, the 
Brigades as a spontaneous effusion of antifascist solidarity.”6 The latter was the narrative 
consistent with that of the People’s Front and the ideologically broad coalition against 
fascism it sought. The former, however, was a component of an increasingly prominent 
fixture of party rhetoric: the battle against Trotskyism. 
 As described in Chapter 2, the failure of European revolution outside of Russia 
and the consequent dangers to the survival of the new Soviet polity that implied quickly 
led to a perceived congruence between the interests of the international communist 
movement and those of the USSR. Russian domination of the Comintern, along with its 
emphasis on protection of the Soviet state, was manifest even before Lenin’s death in 
1924. Continued Bolshevization of international communism, combined with the 
“socialism in one country” doctrine enunciated early in the Stalinist period, solidified the 
role of the Comintern and its constituent parties around the world as instruments of 
Soviet foreign policy rather than as primarily agents of global proletarian revolution. 
Acceptance of that doctrinal development was far from universal among leaders of the 
international workers’ movement. At the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of 
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the Soviet Union in 1926, longtime Comintern leader Grigory Zinoviev proclaimed: “The 
final victory of socialism in one country is impossible. … We are building and will build 
socialism in the USSR with the aid of the world proletariat. … We will win final victory 
because revolution in other countries is inevitable.”7 And although Stalin would have 
Zinoviev shot a decade later, the name most associated with anti-Stalinist sentiment 
within the international proletarian community was that of Leon Trotsky. 
 Founder of the Red Army and member of the first Bolshevik Politburo, Trotsky 
became synonymous in Stalinist (which is to say, official Communist) circles with a level 
of danger, treachery, and thoroughgoing abomination scarcely approached even by 
fascists, whose malign intentions were at least not camouflaged (so the thinking went) by 
Marxist pretentions. The People’s Front policy of joint liberal-left anti-fascism, also a 
Stalin-era doctrinal innovation, coexisted in an apparent contradiction with the Great 
Terror of 1936-38. The Moscow Show Trials of “Trotskyite spies and murderers” 
focused the attention of the international proletariat, along with much of the rest of the 
world, on what Stalin and his supporters portrayed as a vital front in the war against 
fascism (see Figure 3).
8
 And the Soviet leader was clear that timidity in the pursuit of the 
internal enemy would not suffice: “We must chase out the Trotskyites, shoot them, 
destroy them.” He later broadened his vow to “destroy any such enemy, even if he is an 
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old Bolshevik[;] we shall destroy his whole kith and kin. Anyone who encroaches on the 
unity of the socialist state in action or in thought, yes, even in thought, will be mercilessly 
destroyed.”9 As would be evident in Spain, juxtaposition of People’s Front anti-fascist 
unity with Great Terror anti-Trotskyite sectarianism only appears paradoxical if one fails 
to discern their common underpinnings. 
 
Figure 3: The challenge to Stalin’s policies represented by Trotskyism was portrayed as serving the 
interests of fascism, and even of being a component of fascist international strategy. (Daily Worker, 
February 8, 1937. Reproduced with permission, Tamiment Library, New York University.) 
 
 The anti-Trotskyite campaign found expression in Spain largely with reference to 
the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification; 
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POUM). Founded in 1935, its membership, which numbered six thousand at most, was 
composed largely of Catalan-speaking blue-collar and service workers. One of its 
founders, Joaquín Maurín, had observed that the Comintern, rather than the headquarters 
of world revolution it proclaimed itself to be, was instead “an instrument in the service of 
the Soviet state.” Although the party did not identify itself as Trotskyist, its position 
posed the same challenge to Stalinist doctrine and was thus considered by Moscow in the 
same category. The POUM attacked the People’s Front policy as reflective of Soviet self-
interest but reluctantly entered the coalition, running in the elections of February 1936 on 
an explicitly revolutionary platform. The fact that the organization resisted the 
subsequent communist-led initiative to focus on the military struggle with the rebels 
rather than the social revolution against capitalism earned it not only the enmity of the 
communists but eventually its brutal suppression by Soviet agents in Spain.
10
 
 The dual face of communist policy – anti-fascist unity and anti-Trotskyist 
sectarianism – was evident in the party press throughout the period. Promoting a rally for 
Spain scheduled for the following day in New York’s Union Square, CPUSA National 
Chairman William Z. Foster invited Americans to “go forward with us in the formation 
of a national coalition of all progressives … that will be a bulwark against war and the 
fascist threat to the liberties of all toilers. … Shake the fist of international proletarian 
solidarity.”11 Just over a week later the Daily Worker warned its fellow Marxists in the 
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Socialist Party of a “Trotzkyite cancer” in its midst: “Much sooner than it seems to show 
signs now of realizing, the Socialist Party … will have to take cognizance of the 
Trotzkyist poison that is eating at its vitals.” The editorial went on to counsel Socialists, 
“Rid your party of counter-revolutionary Trotzkyism. Join us at once in mobilizing 
support for Spain.”12 Of course the author meant support for the Communist Party-led 
forces in Spain. Later that month the paper informed American workers of the duplicity 
of Trotskyists in that country, where purportedly “Trotzkyism gives especial hope to 
General Franco.” The piece went on to report that “the Trotzkyists concentrate their 
efforts of disruption in Catalonia, through an organization known perversely enough as 
the Workers Party for Marxist Unification (POUM). But an examination of their role very 
readily shows the counter-revolutionary part they play.”13 Only through an understanding 
of the imperatives of Soviet policy in Spain, and thus of the Comintern and its American 
affiliate, can one decipher the characterization of the POUM as “counter-revolutionary.” 
 Attacking Trotskyism, and the POUM in particular, as a force for disunity in the 
proletarian movement was only one of the familiar themes of an entire issue of New 
Masses devoted to Spain, as the war there reached the six-month mark. The international 
implications of the struggle were analyzed by Paul Nizan, foreign editor of the French 
Communist Party organ, L’Humanité. While crediting “the international columns and 
Soviet aid” with having staved off a quick rebel victory, the author adduced the evident 
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resolve of the fascist powers, combined with the apparent acquiescence of the ruling 
classes of Great Britain and France, to predict grave danger to the peace of Europe. 
Another article assailed the US resolution against arms sales to Spain, signed by the 
president on January 8, 1937 – converting the previous “moral embargo” into an official 
one – as “an embargo on democracy.” Anna Louise Strong, Moscow correspondent for 
Soviet Russia Today at the time and longtime radical journalist, published a set of 
appealing portraits of Spanish leftist and republican politicians, including Foreign 
Minister Julio Álvarez del Vayo, Catalonian President Lluís Companys, and Communist 
Cortes Deputy Dolores Ibárruri (“La Pasionaria”), as well as a French and a British 
writer fighting with the loyalists. In addition to the appeals to intellect characteristic of 
the magazine, the English translations of three ballads, taken from a collection of poems 
telling “the heroic story of modern Spain,” were also published in the “Spain: Six Months 
of War” issue.14 
 Reporting on the stated wishes of British Communist writer-turned-battalion-
commissar Ralph Fox, killed a week after her interview with him, Anna Louise Strong 
indicated in her New Masses piece that Fox had urged her to “try to dispel the idea 
[among Americans] that our International Brigade is a foreign legion of mercenary 
adventurers. … It is a real People’s Front army, for all the world. We want only genuine 
anti-fascists. … If they can’t send men, let them send materials.”15 Although public 
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encouragement of American proletarian internationalists to volunteer for service in Spain 
was occasionally overt, for the most part the CPUSA and its publications were mindful of 
the risks involved in violation of US non-intervention policy. The Daily Worker did not 
even broach the topic of American volunteers until December 21, 1936, as an initial 
cohort of ninety-five of them prepared to depart from New York.
16
 On January 13, 1937, 
the US State Department declared that “the enlistment of American citizens in either of 
the opposing sides in Spain is unpatriotically inconsistent with the American 
Government’s policy of the most scrupulous non-intervention in Spanish internal affairs.” 
The most conspicuous sign of that policy was the “not valid for travel in Spain” stamp 
that had been appearing on US passports since the beginning of the war.
17
 Despite such 
efforts, however, by the end of 1936 the CPUSA had recruited nearly 200 volunteers, and 
the first contingents of what later became known as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade arrived 
in Spain in January 1937.
18
 
 On January 12, the US ambassador to Spain sent to the secretary of state a lengthy 
outline of the situation in that country. Noting the presence of “great numbers of soldiers 
from the armies of Germany and Italy,” he described the British plan “to shut off 
volunteers” from going to Spain as a “policy [which] will operate solely in the interest of 
the rebels.” He concluded that “if volunteers are now excluded and professional soldiers 
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of the armies of the Fascist Sates continue to come in, the result is inevitable.”19 On the 
following day, well before the ambassador’s dispatch had arrived in Washington, the 
consul general in Barcelona received a telegram from the State Department that referred 
to a report that seventy-six Americans had recently passed through that city, having 
entered Spain from France. The acting secretary instructed the envoy that if these 
Americans were “contemplating entering the military service either of the Spanish 
Government or of the Spanish insurgents,” he “may point out to these persons” that they 
would be in violation of US policy, which he quoted verbatim.
20
 “These persons” and 
many others like them, of course, had long-since “contemplated” volunteering their 
services in the loyalist cause and were in Spain to implement their commitments to it. 
 By far the most overt call for American volunteers that appeared in the New 
Masses issue devoted to Spain was not part of any article but was instead an 
advertisement that occupied most of a page. Claiming in large, bold font and capital 
letters that “Spain needs American workers,” the notice asked members of that group “to 
take an industrial or productive job in Spain,” explaining that “each such worker would 
free a Spanish worker to join the military forces of his own country. … The Spanish 
people need every fighting man on the front line to save Spain – and you – from the 
                                                 
19
 Ambassador in Spain (Bowers), then in France, to Secretary of State, January 12, 1937, FRUS, 1937, 
Vol. I: General, 223-27. 
20
 Acting Secretary of State to Consul General at Barcelona (Perkins), January 13, 1937, FRUS, 1937, Vol. 
I: General, 471-72. 
99 
 
fascist menace.” It also requested donations to “help send them across.”21 Similar notices 
by the American Society for Technical Aid to Spanish Democracy (ASTASD) appeared 
regularly in the Daily Worker, though other American newspapers refused to run them, 
likely owing to their obvious intent.
22
 A nearly identical mock-up of the advertisement 
that appeared in the New Masses, along with a news release dated January 7, 1937 from 
the ASTASD indicating that “before acceptance of anyone, his trade union and other 
organizational affiliations would be checked to ensure only anti-fascist workers from 
[sic] being sent to Spain by the Society,” is among the Earl Browder Papers.23 The 
Society for Technical Aid was only one among several groups affiliated with the CPUSA 
to whom responsibility for stoking support for the Spanish Republic – including but not 
limited to recruitment of volunteers – increasingly fell. 
 With respect to the task of disseminating information congenial to the loyalist 
cause, arguably the most important of those affiliated organizations was the North 
American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy (NACASD), founded in late 1936. 
Members of the CPUSA Politburo learned at their November 12 meeting that “the 
campaign to aid the Spanish people” had reached a new “stage with the setting up of the 
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy,” which had to that point 
“collected a little over $30,000.” More than half of that sum was gathered at the October 
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26 rally at Madison Square Garden described in Chapter 4.
24
 In early April 1937, 
Browder’s extensive report to the Comintern boasted, “We have been able … to secure a 
broad united front that is actively working in what is called the North American 
Committee for [sic] Spanish Democracy. This was formed on the initiative of the 
American League Against War and Fascism [a CPUSA auxiliary with a number of 
notable non-communist members
25]. … This North American Committee is the 
centralizing organization for all of the mass collections, mass meetings and mass work in 
connection with Spain.” The general secretary went on to name other such affiliates, 
including American Friends of Spanish Democracy, the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish 
Democracy, and the Society for Technical Aid to Spanish Democracy, the last of which 
he described as “a legal organization to cover our activities in organizing the volunteer 
movement.”26    
 By 1937, although the regular communist press continued and even intensified its 
extensive coverage of the war in Spain and its international and ideological contexts, 
pamphlets on the subject – mostly published by the communist-affiliated organizations 
described above – proliferated and became major sources of information and inspiration 
for the proletarian internationalist community and the allies it sought.  
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 At thirty pages, the pamphlet Spain: Battleground of Democracy, produced for 
the NACASD, was unusually extensive. It framed the war as a fight over “a universal 
question: Shall constitutional democracy or dictatorial autocracy prevail?” The author 
summarized “Spain’s century of struggle,” culminating in the election of a People’s Front 
government and leading “the coterie of obstinate generals – backed by the princes of 
finance and by the Church – [to decide] upon bullets to regain the government.” He then 
proceeded to adumbrate the interconnected sociopolitical dimensions of the struggle, 
explaining first “the reasons that the most Catholic of countries has a strong anti-clerical 
movement” and the “top-heaviness” and “undemocratic nature” of the Spanish military. 
The “leading role” of labor in the republic was asserted, and the nature of the loyalist 
army “fighting to save the … government they elected” and “for the division of the land, 
for separation of Church and State, for a democratic army, for the rights of labor” was 
contrasted with that of the “junta of generals, … Moorish mercenaries, the fascist Spanish 
Phalanx, and the monarchist Carlists.” Characterizing the war as “a little world war on 
Spanish soil,” the pamphlet implored Americans not to “be indifferent to the outcome of 
a war for human freedom,” noting the contributions of Lafayette and Kosciusko who 
“made the American struggle for independence their own.” A text box on the final page 
of the document, requesting contributions to the NACASD, urged readers, “Take your 
stand beside the hard-pressed defenders of democracy in Spain.”27 
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 Broadening the political reach of the left was, of course, part of the rationale 
behind the People’s Front strategy. It is thus expectable that liberal-left organizations 
affiliated with but not directly under the aegis of the CPUSA, such as the NACASD and 
others introduced above, would promulgate messages in their publications tailored to a 
wider audience than that of the explicitly communist press. In addition, the assimilation 
of mainstream American liberal historical traditions and values to the aims of the Marxist 
movement and its project in Spain was increasingly evident in the communist press, and 
never more clearly than on the birthdays of the two presidents for whom the American 
battalions of the International Brigades were named.  
 On February 12, the Daily Worker published a photograph of the Lincoln 
Memorial, the caption of which quoted the sixteenth president as having “asserted that 
‘labor is prior to, and independent of capital … and deserves much the higher 
consideration,’” adding that “during his life Lincoln was greeted by Karl Marx in the 
name of the European working class for his fight against slavery.” Several articles in that 
issue were devoted to expositions of Lincoln’s working-class affinities and revolutionary 
credentials. Browder was explicit that, “If the tradition of Lincoln is to survive … this 
will be due not to the Republicans nor to the Democrats, but to the modern 
representatives of historical progress, the COMMUNISTS.” Keeping its distance from 
accusations of recruitment for Spain, however, a photo under the heading “Lincoln 
Company Aids Spanish Democracy” was captioned, in the passive voice, “It is 
understood that a few hundred Americans are fighting on the side of the Loyalists in the 
International Brigade.” And never missing an opportunity to score points against 
103 
 
Trotskyism, the CPUSA newspaper ran a brief piece by Ella Winter, author of the book 
Red Virtue and widow of celebrated progressive journalist Lincoln Steffens, that likened 
(ironically, it would turn out) Trotsky to Lincoln’s assassin, John Wilkes Booth.28 
 Nine days later, on the eve of Washington’s birthday, the cover of the Sunday 
Magazine was a portrait of the nation’s father on horseback, pointing his sword in the 
direction of battle, superimposed on a photograph of militiamen and women defending 
Madrid with rifles aimed toward the same out-of-frame enemy as the American 
revolutionary general’s sword (Figure 4). Linking the people’s army of the Spanish 
Republic to that led by Washington, the caption asserts, “Our famous Continentals would 
recognize in their defiant cry to foreign invader and fascist tyrant the living spirit of ’76: 
‘They Shall Not Pass!’” adding, “Today our Valley Forge lies in Madrid. In the world-
wide fight between reaction and progress, between fascism and the people’s democracy, 
the crucial hour looms.”29 The following day, under the headline, “Communists the Heirs 
of the Revolution of ’76,” the Daily Worker published a section of Browder’s pamphlet, 
“Who Are the Americans?” reminding readers that “the revolutionary tradition is the heart 
of Americanism.” That piece, along with a familiar portrait of the first president, an 
article titled, “George Washington – American Revolutionist,” a column that quoted 
Marx’s praise for the Declaration of Independence on behalf of the First International, 
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and several pieces on Spain, appeared under the banner headline, “Communism is the 
Americanism of the Twentieth Century.”30 Americans born long after the opportunity to 
fight for their country’s independence from imperialism had passed, and too late to join 
in the struggle against the exploitation represented by slavery, could enact their 
quintessentially American – but nonetheless international and universalist – political 
ideals in the war against fascism in Spain. 
 
Figure 4: Assimilation of the Spanish loyalist cause to that of American Revolutionary patriots was 
portrayed concretely on the occasion of Washington’s birthday. (“Valley Forge Lies in Madrid,” Sunday 
Worker, February 21, 1937. Reproduced with permission, Tamiment Library, New York University.) 
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 One such American, Ben Leider, was memorialized in a pamphlet published by an 
affiliate of the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, itself an organization established 
by the CPUSA to help with recruitment for Spain.
31
 Its cover featured a portrait of the 
pilot who “died fighting for democracy” on February 19, and its first page dedicated it “to 
the memory of those Americans who heroically gave their lives that democracy might 
live and to those who are fighting today on the battlefields of Spain for the liberty of the 
Spanish people.” The pamphlet inaccurately labelled Leider as “the first American to be 
killed fighting to save Spain from fascism,” and proceeded to explain his commitment to 
the cause of Spanish democracy in the context of his life story. He shared with many 
other American volunteers a working-class Jewish background and personal experience 
with antisemitism. Having traveled throughout the USSR in 1927, purportedly as a 
reporter, he covered the Harlan County, Kentucky miners’ strikes in the early 1930s in 
which the CPUSA and affiliated organizations were heavily involved.
32
 After the start of 
the war in Spain, Leider reportedly explained to his friends his motivations for 
volunteering: “Listen, I’m not such a great talker as some of you, and I don’t say so 
much. But listen, I can’t sleep nights thinking about kids in this country not eating 
regularly, thinking about what Hitler and Franco are doing to the poor kids in Germany 
and Spain.” Following a description of his heroic feats in the skies over Madrid on 
February 17 and his final mission two days later, the publication quotes a letter to his 
brother that arrived in New York “a few hours after Ben Leider died” in which he 
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characterizes the International Brigades and the hope they brought to the Spanish people 
as “something which has happened for the first time in history.” Asking on the back 
cover, “He gave his life for that cause, what will you give?” the sponsors of the pamphlet 
likely did not have only monetary contributions in mind.
33
     
 Although President Roosevelt had intervened with the US Justice Department to 
prevent prosecution of recruiters for service in Spain,
34
 the past involvement in such 
activities of the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (FALB) attracted the attention 
of the FBI during World War II. Voluminous files later obtained through the Freedom of 
Information Act by the FALB’s successor organization, the Veterans of the Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade (VALB), provide detailed documentation of the FBI’s many 
investigations, establishing connections between the CPUSA and the FALB/VALB and 
outlining their recruitment strategies. Among the numerous individual cases described, 
one report from April 1942 provides the flavor – if not all of the details – of the findings 
of these investigations: 
 [Redacted] is also the subject of the case entitled “[redacted] alias [redacted] 
 Neutrality Act”; San Francisco origin. In the investigation concerning the latter 
 case, one [redacted], Pacific Palisades, California, in a signed statement declared 
 that [redacted] first interested him in … going to Spain to fight for the Loyalists. 
 [Redacted], who is a known Communist in San Francisco, on the staff of the 
 Communist paper, Peoples World, introduced [redacted] to [redacted] at the 
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 Communist Party Bookstore, 15 Embarcadero, San Francisco. [Redacted] was 
 accepted for service in Spain, and he was furnished with a bus ticket to New York 
 by [redacted] … [Redacted] related that [redacted] referred him to [redacted], 
 which is the Communist Party headquarters in San Francisco. According to 
 [redacted] this bus ticket was stamped with “World Tourists, Inc.,” and [redacted] 
 was directed by [redacted] to contact [redacted], Canal Street in New York City. 
 According to [redacted], he followed instructions and was supplied with a 
 steamship ticked by [redacted] and he sailed to France for service in Spain aboard 
 the SS Manhattan.
35
   
 
 The FBI files are filled with similar stories, which are consistent with the later 
direct reports of volunteers. The activities of the FALB were, however, hardly unknown 
to officials in the US government prior to the FBI investigations just described. A letter to 
David White, national chairman of the FALB, from Secretary of State Cordell Hull notes, 
“It is evident from the information in the Department’s possession that most of the 
American citizens who have been serving with the armed forces in Spain were 
encouraged to go there by persons and organizations interested in helping the Spanish 
Government and have had their way paid to Spain by those persons and organizations.” 
The secretary, asserting to the FALB chairman that “your organization is in a position to 
obtain funds from those persons or organizations in this country who have assisted these 
men to go to Spain, and who therefore have a clear responsibility to assist in their 
repatriation,” hoped to shift the financial burden of caring for Americans wounded in 
Spain from the US government to those responsible for their presence there. And his 
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 By March 15, 1937, the US consul at Valencia estimated in a dispatch to the 
secretary of state that “the total number of American citizens enlisted with the Spanish 
Government forces … is approximately 1,700. It is believed that the greater part of these 
obtained American passports issued in December, 1936, and January, 1937.”37 In his 
April 4 report to the Comintern, Browder’s estimate of the number of American 
volunteers in Spain or preparing to travel there at that point was just over 1,700.
38
 It thus 
appears that, although the State Department’s figure was likely inflated, of the 
approximately 2,800 Americans who fought on the loyalist side, a majority of them 
reached their decisions to volunteer by early 1937.
39
 Considering the high casualty rates – 
causing, for example, the Lincoln and Washington Battalions to merge in July, after the 
Jarama and Brunete battles took their heavy tolls – recruitment of replacements for those 
lost continued for much of the remainder of the war. But for the most part the conditions, 
including communist press coverage of the war and its international political context, 
under which Americans formulated their commitments to the cause of Republican Spain 
were in place by early 1937. 
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 Robert Rosenstone’s 1969 study characterizes “the average volunteer” as “a man 
between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven who lived in an industrial, urban center 
where labor unions and radical political parties were most active.” In addition to factory 
workers, seamen, longshoremen, and students were well represented. Most came from 
working-class families and “were more likely to be foreign-born or first-generation 
American than to come from old stock.”40 Although Rosentone estimates the proportion 
of Jews among the volunteers to be at least 30 percent, Gerassi concludes from his oral 
history project that the actual figure was more like 46 percent. The proportion cannot be 
fixed with certainty as the volunteers were not classified by ethnicity. He quotes Albert 
Prago, a Jewish veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, on the subject: “They went to 
Spain as internationalists, as humanists, as anti-fascists, as communists – while they may 
not have denied their Jewish heritage, they did not go to Spain identifying as Jews.”41 
Similarly, as the first US military force to be fully integrated racially among all ranks, 
members were not categorized according to that parameter either. The number of African 
American volunteers is thus uncertain but estimated to be just shy of a hundred.
42
 And 
with respect to political affiliations, Levenson, writing in 1986 in the CPUSA publication 
Political Affairs, adduces previous research to surmise that nearly two-thirds of 
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 American veterans of the Spanish Civil War have been remarkably prolific in 
their accounts of their experiences. And although those who survived differ in the 
conclusions they reached subsequently about the cause for which they risked their lives,
44
 
their motivations for having volunteered to fight – reported in both contemporaneous 
communications and retrospective memoirs – were similar. In a 1985 article, union 
organizer Bill Bailey described his early-1937 decision to join the loyalist cause in terms 
of internationalist anti-fascist commitment. With Mussolini waging war on Ethiopia, 
Hitler oppressing communists, socialists, trade unionists, and Jews, and the working class 
of the United States suffering disproportionately “the ills of a prolonged depression,” 
Bailey “joined with other progressive citizens … to put life into the idea of a united front 
against war and fascism.” Having visited Spain in 1935 while working as a merchant 
seaman, he “had great admiration for the Spanish worker and farmer” and with the onset 
of civil war the following year, “as a Communist,” Bailey “was convinced beyond doubt 
that what was happening in Spain would have a profound impact upon the struggle 
against fascism.” He “worked feverishly against the Neutrality Act from the beginning” 
and, “once the Republic had opened its arms and accepted the International Brigade to 
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defend its cause, all other things seemed to fade into the background. A serious wrong 
had to be corrected.”45 
 Nearly a half-century earlier, labor organizer and CPUSA activist Joe Dallet 
explained his internationalist motivations to his mother in a letter from Paris before 
entering the war zone: “You know that I have been very much concerned with the 
situation in Spain. I profoundly believe that the military invasion of Hitler and Mussolini 
into democratic Spain must receive a military defeat of the first order if the peace of 
Europe and the world is to be preserved and if fascism is to be checked, instead of 
spread.” After assuring her that he would be “careful” in Spain, Dallet tried to console his 
mother that if he should be killed, she could “have the satisfaction of knowing that [he] 
fell in the most important battle in the world – the battle of democracy against fascism.” 
He reminded her that “without the help of the gallant Lafayette and his men, we would 
not be today the free USA.” And in a swipe at the American neutrality policy in 
contravention of which he had determined that he must act, Dallet wrote, “The free, 
democratic nations MUST unite against the fascist oppressors, and if to the ever-lasting 
shame of our fine national traditions the Roosevelt government helps the fascists rather 
than the friendly Spanish government, then right-thinking Americans must try to make up 
for this by their own actions.”46 In early May, in a letter to party comrades back home 
written from the International Brigades headquarters in Albacete, Dallet picked up on 
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another recurrent theme of the communist press, reassuring them that “in this part of the 
country one sees no traces at all of the defeatist and counter-revolutionary Trotskyite 
propaganda.”47 Less than six months later Joe Dallet died fighting on the Aragon Front. 
 Like so many Americans, Carl Geiser of Orville, Ohio was deeply affected, 
personally and politically, by the Great Depression. By the early 1930s he had gravitated 
toward radical politics, joining the Young Communist League and the communist-led 
National Student League. As he later explained to journalist John Gerassi, “With fascism 
on the rise everywhere in Europe, it suddenly became very visible in the United States as 
well, with the Christian Front, Father Coughlin, the Nazi bund, and all. The consequence 
was that we got polarized quickly and I became more and more active.” After the military 
rebellion in Spain had clearly attracted potentially decisive military aid from Italy and 
Germany, Geiser decided by January 1937 that he “had to go.”48 He described in a letter 
to his brother his rationale for volunteering as including a desire “to prevent a second 
world war” and, as a “democratic and liberty-loving” American, an obligation “to fight 
fascism.” Recognizing the international stakes involved, Geiser warned, “We ought not to 
think that if the fascists take Spain we are safe … [any] more than we ought to think our 
house is safe if [the] neighbor’s is on fire.”49 Freed in April 1939 after a year in rebel 
captivity in Spain during which he barely escaped execution, Carl Geiser returned home 
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 Many volunteers explicitly invoked the interests of their ethnic groups alongside 
their more general internationalism. Hoping to satisfy her quandaries, if not allay her 
anxieties, Hyman Katz wrote to his mother, “I came to Spain because I felt I had to. Look 
at the world situation,” and asked her, “Don’t you realize that we Jews will be the first to 
suffer if fascism comes?” After expanding upon that rhetorical question he added, “Yes, 
Ma, this is a case where sons must go against their mothers’ wishes for the sake of their 
mothers themselves. So I took up arms against the persecutors of my people – the Jews – 
and my class – the Oppressed. I am fighting against those who establish an inquisition 
like that of their ideological ancestors several centuries ago in Spain.”51 
 Much as Jewish Americans were drawn to the anti-fascist cause as a response to 
antisemitism in general and that of the Nazis in particular, African Americans gravitated 
toward it as an antidote to the discrimination and violence they faced at home and to the 
Italian Fascist war of imperial conquest in Ethiopia (see Figure 5). Jamaican-American 
immigrant Canute Frankson wrote from Spain to a friend in July 1937 to explain “why I, 
a Negro, who have fought through these years for the rights of my people, am here in 
Spain today.” Linking “the vicious persecution, wholesale imprisonment, and slaughter 
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which the Jewish people suffered and are suffering under Hitler’s Fascist heels” with “the 
pages of American history stained with the blood of Negroes; stink with the burning 
bodies of our people hanging from trees,” Frankson foresaw in the defeat of fascism “a 
new society – a society of peace and plenty [where] there will be no color line, no jim-
crow trains, no lynching.” Invoking the name of Communist cause célèbre Angelo 
Herndon, he concluded to his friend, “That is why, my dear, I’m here in Spain.”52 A 
pamphlet published by the Negro Committee to Aid Spain sought to explain – as well as 
bolster – the motivations of black volunteers: “To them Spain was now the battlefield on 
which Italian fascism might be defeated. And perhaps Italy defeated in Spain would be 
forced to withdraw from Ethiopia. … The place to defeat Italy just now is in Spain.”53 
                                                 
52
 Ibid., 33–35. 
53
 A Negro Nurse in Republican Spain (New York: Negro Committee to Aid Spain with the Medical 
Bureau and North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, 1938?), PAMALBA 314, Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade Archives. See also Collum, ed., African Americans in the Spanish Civil War, and James 
Yates, Mississippi to Madrid: Memoirs of a Black American in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1938 (New 




Figure 5: The Ethiopian struggle against Italian Fascist aggression was among the factors attracting 
African Americans to the loyalist cause in Spain. (Daily Worker, May 7, 1937. Reproduced with 
permission, Tamiment Library, New York University.) 
 
 Whether white or black, Jewish or gentile, worker or student, revolutionary or 
liberal, each of the approximately 2,800 Americans who left home to fight with the 
Spanish loyalists doubtless had his or her own reasons for making that decision. What 
they had in common, however, was a conviction that events in Spain were of universal 
human significance and that the defeat of fascism was a necessary prerequisite to creation 
of a world in which they would wish to live. For at least two of every three of those 
American volunteers, that aspirational world was a collectivized one on the model of 
what some knew, but most only imagined, existed in the Soviet Union under the 
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Communist Party. As its representative in the United States, the CPUSA and its 
publications were enormously influential among this relatively small but energetic and 
committed group of proletarian internationalists who felt compelled to answer the call – 
both direct and indirect – of their movement. Their decisions came at tremendous cost: 
almost a third of them were dead when 1938 began and over 70 percent of the survivors 
who fought in Spain had been wounded at least once.
54
 Nor did their sacrifices produce 
the desired results. With the republic effectively defeated militarily, the government 
decided in September 1938 on the withdrawal of all foreign volunteers in the vain hope 
that the other side would do likewise.
55
 By the end of March 1939, all Spanish territory 
was in rebel hands.
56
 Many of the warnings of the consequences of that outcome – for the 
Spanish people and for the rest of Europe – expressed by the proletarian anti-fascist 
fighters proved not to have been exaggerated.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 Exactly a century after the Working Men’s Association’s Address to the Belgian 
Working Classes, generally considered one of the first expressions of modern proletarian 
internationalism,
1
 members of the global laboring classes rallied impressively to the 
defense of the embattled Spanish Republic. They devoted their words, their thoughts, 
their time, their organizational capacities, their money, and in thousands of instances their 
lives in an effort to quell what they saw as an existential threat – embodied in the various 
right-wing movements they conceptualized under the rubric of fascism – to the success 
and survival not of their individual nation-states but of their explicitly transnational social 
class and political movement. The hundred years between those two events witnessed the 
transformation of the workers’ movement from small organizations of limited reach to a 
world-wide network of communist parties whose adherents were disciplined and 
committed and whose mentor and master was itself a state – albeit of an ostensibly new 
type.  
 The Comintern was established as the headquarters of global Marxist revolution, 
though its mission quickly became representation of the interests of the Soviet polity 
whose survival was considered synonymous with that of the international workers’ 
movement. When aggressively nationalist and violently anti-communist regimes in 
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Germany and Italy were finally recognized as threats to the security of the USSR, Soviet 
policy – and, not coincidentally, international communist doctrine – came to view 
containment of their expansionist aspirations as an objective of paramount importance, 
warranting establishment of previously heretical alliances with non-communist leftist and 
liberal parties and organizations. And when the duly elected government of Spain, which 
instantiated the Moscow-inspired People’s Front policy of anti-fascist unity, was 
assaulted by a right-wing coalition that included fascists and was aided by the fascist 
states of Europe, the Soviet party and government and their international arm resolved to 
mobilize the politicized global proletariat, and as many of its allies as could be mustered, 
to save it. 
 In the United States, the success of the Russian Revolution had, as in many other 
countries, engendered a division in the Marxist movement, with the left wing bolting the 
Socialist Party – whose weakness as an instrument of proletarian internationalism was 
exposed in the failure of the Second International to prevent the First World War – and 
forming a revolutionary party aligned with that of the Soviet Union and with the 
Comintern. The early years of what became the CPUSA were marked by factional 
infighting and a marginal existence on the fringes of American radical politics. But with 
the economic and social traumas of the Great Depression, and the People’s Front policy 
instituted by the Comintern to defeat fascism, the Communist Party became the political 
home to growing numbers of American workers, both employed and unemployed, as well 
as students and intellectuals. To the already-strong representation of Jews and other 
relatively recent European immigrants was added, as a reflection of the party’s consistent 
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commitment to racial equality, the allegiance of a significant contingent of Americans of 
African ancestry. Successes in the arenas of labor organization and social legislation 
strengthened the prestige of the CPUSA among leftists and progressives such that the 
party was able to lead – albeit in many instances through affiliated “front” groups – the 
efforts of American proletarian internationalists to defeat the Spanish rebels and their 
foreign allies. 
 Prominent among the means by which the CPUSA nurtured the sense of 
community among American working-class radicals required to mobilize them at the 
behest of the Comintern in the Spanish cause was the printed word. In aggregate, the 
attention devoted to the civil war in Spain in the Daily and Sunday Worker, along with 
the New Masses as well as dozens of pamphlets and leaflets produced by CPUSA 
affiliates, was simply staggering and without present-day parallel. The sheer volume of 
printed material on the topic imparted to readers of the American communist press a 
priority and an urgency that were unmistakable. The messages contained in those nearly 
countless news articles, feature pieces, editorials, guest columns, political cartoons, 
personal profiles, historical primers, inspiring anecdotes, pleas for donations, and veiled 
exhortations to enlist to fight represented a finite number of themes which appeared in 
myriad configurations leading up to and during the war.  
 Unsurprisingly, considering the rationale behind the People’s Front strategy and 
its deployment in the defense of the Spanish loyalists, the dangers of fascism constituted 
a nearly ubiquitous theme in the American communist press throughout the period. 
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Fascism was variously characterized as a threat to democracy and personal liberties in 
general, and to the success and survival of the labor movement in particular. At the global 
level it was portrayed as posing a grave hazard to the peace of the world, and more 
specifically to the longevity of the Soviet state and thus of the international communist 
cause. People’s Front anti-fascism, on the other hand, was depicted as the means by 
which the success of international fascism – a construct which was at times cast in 
sufficiently broad terms to include, for example, domestic conservatives in the 
Republican Party and Hearst newspaper editorial offices – would be checked and the 
forces of progress bolstered. The Manichean nature of the global struggle left no room for 
ambivalence, or even half-heartedness, in one’s allegiance. That principle applied to 
states and their foreign policies as much as it applied to individuals. Thus, the moral 
shame of official US neutrality was condemned while the sham of the European non-
intervention agreement was denounced as cover for pro-rebel sentiment among elites in 
the western democracies.   
 Portrayal of the forces behind the global efforts on behalf of the Spanish 
government was a matter that demanded more nuance. As noted in Chapter 2, although 
Stalin ultimately determined that a fascist state on the Iberian Peninsula was an outcome 
that must be resisted, he was nearly as concerned about the potential for spooking 
western public opinion through a conspicuous Soviet presence there, dooming his 
aspirations for a collective security arrangement against the fascist powers.
2
 The 
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American communist press thus walked a line between characterizing anti-fascist 
commitment as broad-based and democratic, on the one hand, and as communist-led and 
motivated by the priorities of the radical working classes, on the other. Although the anti-
Trotskyist campaign may be seen as a dramatic exception to People’s Front left-wing 
unity, it served as a vehicle through which valorization of the Communist Party and its 
Soviet patron could be presented in both uncompromisingly sectarian and comfortingly 
ecumenical ways. Trotsky’s rejection of the Stalinist doctrine of “socialism in one 
country” – and the implications that rejection carried for the global revolutionary 
workers’ movement – could be attacked as undermining the foundations of anti-fascist 
collaboration with non-communist forces and thus simultaneously endangering the 
western democracies and the USSR. In that context, praise of the Soviet leaders, policies, 
and people for their leadership of the proletarian struggle against fascism coexisted 
seamlessly with characterizations of communism as “twentieth-century Americanism” 
and a loudly proclaimed commitment to democracy, human rights, and representative 
government that justified naming the US battalions in Spain for Washington and Lincoln. 
Anti-fascism and pro-communism were thus two sides of the same coin for CPUSA 
partisans, if not for their non-communist allies. 
 As seen in Chapter 5, the political formulations of those Americans whose 
dedication to the Spanish loyalist cause was sufficient to compel them to volunteer to risk 
their lives in its prosecution bear striking resemblances to those promulgated by the 
communist press during the period in which those volunteers’ commitments were being 
developed. Although such correlation cannot be taken as proof of unidirectional 
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causality, the evidence adduced above points persuasively to the importance of the 
voluminous and persistent coverage of Spain in CPUSA and affiliated publications in 
reinforcing convictions among American working-class radicals that Spain was the 
crucible in which the great global ideological struggle of their time was being waged and 
in providing a language for the expression of those convictions. It would be an error, 
however, to interpret that as a demonstration that American participants were mere 
recipients of ideas passed, bucket-brigade style, from Stalin and the Soviet party to the 
Comintern to the CPUSA leadership to rank-and-file readers of the communist press. 
That is not to say that anti-communists like Herbert Romerstein have no basis for 
asserting that “the cynical men in Moscow who made the political decisions, and those in 
New York who made sure they were carried out, cared little for the young victims. They 
were tools to be used on behalf of the Soviet Union and the international Communist 
movement.”3 But if American volunteers in Spain were “tools,” they were in large 
measure willing ones with deep and sincerely held affinities for the international 
proletarian community of which most saw themselves as integral members. 
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 The historiography of American communism, as outlined in Chapter 2, has tended 
either to emphasize the development of the party’s organizational structure and its 
allegiance to and ultimate dependence on the leadership apparatus in Moscow, or to focus 
on the roles of American communists as genuine participants in radical politics within 
their local communities. Missing from those accounts is the formulation suggested by the 
foregoing evidence. That the CPUSA hierarchy followed policy dictates handed to it 
from above is beyond dispute. And while it surely exploited the substantial means of 
communication at its disposal to nurture the “imagined community” of proletarian 
internationalists for its own purposes, party members and their allies not only constituted 
that community; in many instances they defined themselves and their convictions and 
aspirations by it. The communist press undoubtedly shaped the perceptions, informed the 
opinions, and influenced the priorities of its readers, but for the most part their political 
ideologies were already formed. 
 Observers from the left have generally conceived of the Spanish Civil War as “the 
last great cause,” and view with nostalgia and reverence the selfless dedication of the 
Lincolns to the freedom of a foreign people. Those on the right have tended to conclude 
that the volunteers were either hardened communist ideologues following the dictates of 
their Kremlin masters as filtered through intermediaries in the American party, or tragic 
dupes of self-serving communist propaganda. As the foregoing has shown, each of those 
formulations is correct but incomplete. Moreover, it is clear that those who left home to 
fight fascist aggression in Spain were motivated by an internationalist ideology of 
proletarian solidarity that was highly compelling to many working-class Americans of 
124 
 
whom insularity might instead have been expected. In our own era in which political 
boundaries have become less relevant in the face of violent non-state actors and global 
environmental threats, understanding how international ideological commitment is 
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